1971 War (Western Theatre) in a Nutshell

Unsure at the Helm

1.  Gen Yahya was reluctant to exercise military option as late as November 1971. In an address to NDC officers he stated, “I am not so stupid as to go to war with India. I will do my best for a political solution to avoid war." (Before, During, After Maj Gen Wajahat Hussain, Ferozsons Ltd.)

2.  Air Mshl Rahim Khan was in a vengeful and angry mood because of the massacre of 20 airmen and an officer of a Mobile Observer Unit in Mymensingh Jail, and also for the attempted hijacking of a T-33 by a Bengali instructor pilot that resulted in the death of the PAF student pilot.

3.  GHQ's Principal Staff Officers were not on speaking terms with each other. (Unlikely Beginnings, Maj Gen Mitha O A, Oxford University Press.)

4.  Following October parleys between Chinese senior leadership and Pakistani team which included Z A Bhutto, Lt Gen Gul Hassan, Air Mshl Rahim Khan and ambassador Sultan M Khan, Bhutto gave a completely misleading debrief to Yahya. While the Chinese had advised a political solution to the crisis, Bhutto told Yahya that Chinese had no idea about geo-politics and the parleys had been a waste of time. (Quoted by Sultan M Khan.)

Army’s Flawed Strategy

War preparations on the Pakistani side were seriously constrained by shortfalls in the Army’s fighting formations. The move of two infantry divisions from West Pakistan was clearly a short-term response to the deteriorating situation in East Pakistan; it gravely altered the balance in the West – the main theatre of war. Any operational reverses that might occur would have to be redressed by denuding the strategic reserves. Unfortunately, this meant that the very foundations of a Pakistani military response had been fatally weakened.

India’s defences, on the other hand were strong in all sectors, and she was confident of stopping any Pakistani foray, were Pakistan to attempt capture of vital territory as a sop for the loss of East Pakistan.

There was no possibility of a Pakistani offensive succeeding in the West because the reserve formations, ie II Corps and Army Reserve North (ARN) had been denuded of major portions of their armour, infantry and artillery elements for fire-fighting elsewhere.

        II Corps (1 Armd Div, 33 Inf Div, 7 Div)

-          124 Bde (ex-33 Div) to 8 Div for defence of Shakargarh Sector.

-          60 Bde (ex-33 Div) to 18 Div for defence of Naya Chor Sector.

  ARN (6 Armd Div, 17 Inf Div)

            -     17 Div Arty to 23 Div to bolster forces in Chamb.

-          66 Bde (ex-17 Div) to 23 Div to bolster forces in Chamb.

-     88 Bde (ex-17 Div) to 10 Div as ploy for offensive in Maqboolpur area.

-     7 Arm Bde (ex-6 Arm Div) to bolster forces in Chamb and Okara, reducing 6 Arm Div to an armoured brigade group.

Even if these strategic formations were at full strength, it would have taken weeks of slugging against equally powerful and similar-sized formations of the adversary. A superior relative strength ratio neither existed at the outset, nor was it possible to create, as all enemy sectors were very well defended. 

The critical situation in Shakargarh Sector and Naya Chor was threatening the heartland of Punjab and Sindh, and hence the very integrity of the country. It was just as well that the ARN or II Corps was not committed for any offensive operations at the outset, as their timely withdrawal, transfer and re-insertion in the threatened sectors would have been impossible, subsequently. A catastrophic situation was averted by not committing the reserves at the outset.

PAF’s Performance

1.  In Northern Sector, PAF, in concert with Army’s AAA, was able to achieve a favourable air situation and managed to remain a force in being.

2.  In Southern Sector, Air Defence was a hopeless cause from the outset due to limited air defence assets, and nil sensors for seaward air defence.

3.  Army AAA did an outstanding job in shooting down 60% of all IAF aircraft in West and East Pakistan.

4.  Lip service was paid to naval support, as audacious and imaginative planning was lacking.  Destruction of the gunboat harbours on Saurashtra coast at the outset, as was done later against Okha harbour, could have prevented a rout.

5.  Offensive counter air operations against airfields caused optimal softening up. For 10% of the total effort, the degree of disruption was quite adequate and tied down IAF effort for air defence.

6.  Keeping no aircraft in Jacobabad for air support proved devastating for 18 Division in Longewala-Ramgarh Sector.  Half a squadron of F-6s placed in Mianwali turned out to be useless, and could have been operated from Jacobabad for:

        a.  Air Support in Ramgarh Sector (120 nm), which was within range of  F-6s, and was the          same distance as was flown from Sargodha to Shakargarh.

        b.  Air Defence of the vitally important Sui gas facility (45 nm).

        c.  Air Defence of Reti-RYK communications lifeline (100 nm).

Territory Lost in West Pakistan/Kashmir (Simla Agreement 4 Aug 1972)

1.   Pakistan lost 5,139 sq miles in Punjab and Sindh.

2.  India lost 69 sq miles in Punjab and Rajisthan.

3.   Pakistan retained 52 sq miles in Kashmir.

4.   India retained 480 sq miles in Kashmir.