1971 War (Western Theatre) in a Nutshell

Unsure at the Helm

1.  Gen Yahya was reluctant to exercise military option as late as November 1971. In an address to NDC officers he stated, “I am not so stupid as to go to war with India. I will do my best for a political solution to avoid war." (Before, During, After Maj Gen Wajahat Hussain, Ferozsons Ltd.)

2.  Air Mshl Rahim Khan was in a vengeful and angry mood because of the massacre of 20 airmen and an officer of a Mobile Observer Unit in Mymensingh Jail, and also for the attempted hijacking of a T-33 by a Bengali instructor pilot that resulted in the death of the PAF student pilot.

3.  GHQ's Principal Staff Officers were not on speaking terms with each other. (Unlikely Beginnings, Maj Gen Mitha O A, Oxford University Press.)

4.  Following October parleys between Chinese senior leadership and Pakistani team which included Z A Bhutto, Lt Gen Gul Hassan, Air Mshl Rahim Khan and ambassador Sultan M Khan, Bhutto gave a completely misleading debrief to Yahya. While the Chinese had advised a political solution to the crisis, Bhutto told Yahya that Chinese had no idea about geo-politics and the parleys had been a waste of time. (Quoted by Sultan M Khan.)

Army’s Flawed Strategy

War preparations on the Pakistani side were seriously constrained by shortfalls in the Army’s fighting formations. The move of two infantry divisions from West Pakistan was clearly a short-term response to the deteriorating situation in East Pakistan; it gravely altered the balance in the West – the main theatre of war. Any operational reverses that might occur would have to be redressed by denuding the strategic reserves. Unfortunately, this meant that the very foundations of a Pakistani military response had been fatally weakened.

India’s defences, on the other hand were strong in all sectors, and she was confident of stopping any Pakistani foray, were Pakistan to attempt capture of vital territory as a sop for the loss of East Pakistan.

There was no possibility of a Pakistani offensive succeeding in the West because the reserve formations, ie II Corps and Army Reserve North (ARN) had been denuded of major portions of their armour, infantry and artillery elements for fire-fighting elsewhere.

        II Corps (1 Armd Div, 33 Inf Div, 7 Div)

-          124 Bde (ex-33 Div) attached to 8 Div for defence of Shakargarh Sector.

-          60 Bde (ex-33 Div) attached to 18 Div for defence of Naya Chor Sector.

  ARN (6 Armd Div, 17 Inf Div)

            -     17 Div Arty attached to 23 Div to bolster forces in Chamb.

-          66 Bde (ex-17 Div) attached to 23 Div to bolster forces in Chamb.

-     88 Bde (ex-17 Div) attached to 10 Div as ploy for offensive in Maqboolpur area.

-     7 Arm Bde (ex-6 Arm Div) moved to bolster forces in Chamb and Okara, reducing 6 Arm Div to an armoured brigade group.

Even if these strategic formations were at full strength, it would have taken weeks of slugging against equally powerful and similar-sized formations of the adversary. A superior relative strength ratio neither existed at the outset, nor was it possible to create, as all enemy sectors were very well defended. 

The critical situation in Shakargarh Sector and Naya Chor was threatening the heartland of Punjab and Sindh, and hence the very integrity of the country. It was just as well that the ARN or II Corps was not committed for any offensive operations at the outset, as their timely withdrawal, transfer and re-insertion in the threatened sectors would have been impossible, subsequently. A catastrophic situation was averted by not committing the reserves at the outset.

PAF’s Performance

1.  In Northern Sector, PAF, in concert with Army’s AAA, was able to achieve a favourable air situation and managed to remain a force in being.

2.  In Southern Sector, Air Defence was a hopeless cause from the outset due to limited air defence assets, and nil sensors for seaward air defence.

3.  Army AAA did an outstanding job in shooting down 60% of all IAF aircraft in West and East Pakistan.

4.  Lip service was paid to naval support, as audacious and imaginative planning was lacking.  Destruction of the gunboat harbours on Saurashtra coast at the outset, as was done later against Okha harbour, could have prevented a rout.

5.  Offensive counter air operations against airfields caused optimal softening up. For 10% of the total effort, the degree of disruption was quite adequate and tied down IAF effort for air defence.

6.  Keeping no aircraft in Jacobabad for air support proved devastating for 18 Division in Longewala-Ramgarh Sector.  Half a squadron of F-6s placed in Mianwali turned out to be useless, and could have been operated from Jacobabad for:

        a.  Air Support in Ramgarh Sector (120 nm), which was within range of  F-6s, and was the          same distance as was flown from Sargodha to Shakargarh.

        b.  Air Defence of the vitally important Sui gas facility (45 nm).

        c.  Air Defence of Reti-RYK communications lifeline (100 nm).

Territory Lost in West Pakistan/Kashmir (Simla Agreement 4 Aug 1972)

1.   Pakistan lost 5,139 sq miles in Punjab and Sindh.

2.  India lost 69 sq miles in Punjab and Rajisthan.

3.   Pakistan retained 52 sq miles in Kashmir.

4.   India retained 480 sq miles in Kashmir.

      

1965 War in a Nutshell

Pakistani Higher Leadership Mistakes

1.  Wrong assumption that a successful brigade-level operation in Rann of Kutch could be replicated in an all-out war.

2.   Hasty and insufficient preparations for Operation ‘Gibraltar’ (uprising in Kashmir).

3.  Big mistake in assuming that Operation ‘Gibraltar’ could succeed without taking Kashmiri local leaders into confidence for material and moral support, notwithstanding the demands of secrecy about the operation.

4.  President Ayub got talked into a wrong and self-serving assessment by Z A Bhutto (then Foreign Minister), and possibly by Maj Gen Akhtar Malik (Commander 12 Div), that Operation ‘Grand Slam’ (capture of Akhnur) would not result in retaliation across the international border.

5.  If Gen Musa disagreed with the government’s appreciation of India restricting the fight to Kashmir only (as he claimed in his book), he should have resigned.

6. Wrong appreciation by President Ayub that slowing down Operation ‘Grand Slam’ through replacement of energetic and unstoppable 12 Div Commander, Maj Gen Akhtar Malik, the imminent Indian offensive against Lahore could somehow be staved off. 

7.  With the launch of Operation ‘Grand Slam’, Pak Army should have been put on the highest alert in all sectors which was not done.

8.   Changing the PAF C-in-C just 40 days prior to war was a very risky thing to do, though it is another matter that Air Mshl Nur Khan learnt the ropes in no time.

Indian Higher Leadership Mistake

1.  Indian Army launched the main offensive on 6 Sep without air cover, allowing PAF to maul Indian offensive elements unhindered, till late afternoon.

PAF Leadership Mistakes

1.  Ill-considered decision to strike remaining airfields (Adampur & Halwara) after IAF had been alerted following the Pathankot raid on evening of 6 Sep.

2. Absolutely reckless decision to send para-dropped commandos to attack IAF bases, without any preparation or rehearsal whatsoever.

IAF Leadership Mistakes

1.  IAF fielded third-rate Vampire fighters for the opening round on 1 Sep in Chamb.

2. IAF failed to knock out PAF's main Sargodha airbase on the morning of 6 Sep before launch of India's main army offensive.

3.  IAF completely failed to intervene once its spearhead elements were being mauled on 6 Sep between Wagah and Batapur.

4.  IAF failed to safeguard its airfields on the opening day of the war. PAF raids on Pathankot and Kalaikunda (attacked a day later) were shocking and absolutely morale shattering for the IAF.

5.  IAF failed to adequately protect or disperse its aircraft assets at the bases, losing 39 aircraft on the ground, as against only one lost by PAF.

6.  High altitude bombing by Canberras was a useless tactic, borne of an overly cautious attitude in war. The total effort was a waste. 

PAF Leadership Brilliance

1.  Credit to previous C-in-C, Air Mshl Asghar Khan, for preparing sound war plans and ensuring most professional training.

2.  Credit to Air Mshl Nur Khan for putting PAF on highest alert when he sensed something was brewing.

3.  Credit to Air Mshl Nur Khan for flying risky missions at the outbreak of hostilities, to show that he was leading from the front.

4.  Credit to Squadron Commanders who led the most difficult missions, with three of them achieving martyrdom, four of them achieving as many as nine kills, and all ten of them getting gallantry awards.

5.  Squadron Commanders of the Pathankot and Kalaikunda raids (Sqn Ldr Sajad Haider and Sqn Ldr Shabbir H Syed) helped achieve the crowning glory of PAF’s combat performance, while Sqn Ldr M M Alam and Sqn Ldr Sarfaraz Rafiqui carried the day in the air.

6.  Credit to bomber pilots for carrying out very difficult and dangerous night raids, at low level in the face of ack ack.

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