1965 War in a Nutshell

Pakistani Higher Leadership Mistakes

1.  Wrong assumption that a successful brigade-level operation in Rann of Kutch could be replicated in an all-out war.

2.   Hasty and insufficient preparations for Operation ‘Gibraltar’ (uprising in Kashmir).

3.  Big mistake in assuming that Operation ‘Gibraltar’ could succeed without taking Kashmiri local leaders into confidence for material and moral support, notwithstanding the demands of secrecy about the operation.

4.  President Ayub got talked into a wrong and self-serving assessment by Z A Bhutto (then Foreign Minister), and possibly by Maj Gen Akhtar Malik (Commander 12 Div), that Operation ‘Grand Slam’ (capture of Akhnur) would not result in retaliation across the international border.

5.  If Gen Musa disagreed with the government’s appreciation of India restricting the fight to Kashmir only (as he claimed in his book), he should have resigned.

6. Wrong appreciation by President Ayub that slowing down Operation ‘Grand Slam’ through replacement of energetic and unstoppable 12 Div Commander, Maj Gen Akhtar Malik, the imminent Indian offensive against Lahore could somehow be staved off. 

7.  With the launch of Operation ‘Grand Slam’, Pak Army should have been put on the highest alert in all sectors which was not done.

8.   Changing the PAF C-in-C just 40 days prior to war was a very risky thing to do, though it is another matter that Air Mshl Nur Khan learnt the ropes in no time.

Indian Higher Leadership Mistake

1.  Indian Army launched the main offensive on 6 Sep without air cover, allowing PAF to maul Indian offensive elements unhindered, till late afternoon.

PAF Leadership Mistakes

1.  Ill-considered decision to strike remaining airfields (Adampur & Halwara) after IAF had been alerted following the Pathankot raid on evening of 6 Sep.

2. Absolutely reckless decision to send para-dropped commandos to attack IAF bases, without any preparation or rehearsal whatsoever.

IAF Leadership Mistakes

1.  IAF fielded third-rate Vampire fighters for the opening round on 1 Sep in Chamb.

2. IAF failed to knock out PAF's main Sargodha airbase on the morning of 6 Sep before launch of India's main army offensive.

3.  IAF completely failed to intervene once its spearhead elements were being mauled on 6 Sep between Wagah and Batapur.

4.  IAF failed to safeguard its airfields on the opening day of the war. PAF raids on Pathankot and Kalaikunda (attacked a day later) were shocking and absolutely morale shattering for the IAF.

5.  IAF failed to adequately protect or disperse its aircraft assets at the bases, losing 39 aircraft on the ground, as against only one lost by PAF.

6.  High altitude bombing by Canberras was a useless tactic, borne of an overly cautious attitude in war. The total effort was a waste. 

PAF Leadership Brilliance

1.  Credit to previous C-in-C, Air Mshl Asghar Khan, for preparing sound war plans and ensuring most professional training.

2.  Credit to Air Mshl Nur Khan for putting PAF on highest alert when he sensed something was brewing.

3.  Credit to Air Mshl Nur Khan for flying risky missions at the outbreak of hostilities, to show that he was leading from the front.

4.  Credit to Squadron Commanders who led the most difficult missions, with three of them achieving martyrdom, four of them achieving as many as nine kills, and all ten of them getting gallantry awards.

5.  Squadron Commanders of the Pathankot and Kalaikunda raids (Sqn Ldr Sajad Haider and Sqn Ldr Shabbir H Syed) helped achieve the crowning glory of PAF’s combat performance, while Sqn Ldr M M Alam and Sqn Ldr Sarfaraz Rafiqui carried the day in the air.

6.  Credit to bomber pilots for carrying out very difficult and dangerous night raids, at low level in the face of ack ack.

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