08 August 2026

Core Values of PAF

One of the most relevant and important topics in any military institution of learning is a study of the core values of the parent service.  Speaking of the core values of Pakistan Air Force, one wonders if these are any different from those of other military services, or even the public at  large. Do the values like commitment, courage, discipline, excellence, honour, integrity, respect, selflessness and teamwork differ in the Army, Navy and the Air Force? Or is it that each of these services assigns different priorities to these values based on its working conditions, combat demands, personnel outlook and management styles? 

It does not take long for one to surmise that the value system of each service is structured largely on intrinsic factors peculiar to it. As an example, the degree and level of skills, educational qualifications, and even the socio-cultural background of personnel may be of consequence in determining how the value system is structured in each service, and what attributes get precedence over others. Similarly, it is not hard to see that in the fast-paced environment of the Air Force where the human response time to challenging situations is reduced drastically, the operability and implementation of any value system needs an approach nuanced accordingly, as far as priorities and emphasis are concerned.

While many of us understand the meaning of core values, a solid definition is vital to this discourse. By their very definitions, ‘core’ means what is at the centre, while ‘values’ define our beliefs. Core values then translate into beliefs that are at the centre of who we are, and define us both as individuals and professionals. They are the critical, intangible essentials that bring continuity and meaning to life. They are the pillars that support all we do, and define who we are. While core values define us as individuals, they also define our country’s institutions.  Both people and institutions have values and thesee need to be shared values. When individual and institutional values conflict, you can expect a crippling impact on one or both.

In these modern times, we live in an era of relative values, where right is determined by what advances one’s personal interests. That is completely in contrast to the core values we aspire to.  Core values are the beacons, the means by which you always know what to do, because you are guided by that consistent, unchanging set of values. They help you navigate through turbulent times, whether on an individual or at the institutional level.

Values develop and evolve over the course of a lifetime. You may see them on the wall of a building or read them in the pages of a book, but it takes time for them to move from the wall or the page, to your heart.

Core values are standards on which rest the very edifice of the military. These values, along with ethical leadership, instil confidence, earn lasting respect, and create willing workers. They guarantee the trust of subordinates in the orders given by their leaders. They create the special esprit de corps and bonding that is so essential for the teamwork required in combat. They ensure the confidence of our people in the defence of Pakistan. The core values are much more than minimum standards. They remind us what it takes to get the mission done. They inspire us to do our very best at all times. They are the common bond among all comrades in arms, and they are the glue that unifies the force and ties us to the war heroes and devoted public servants of the past. That is why the people of Pakistan rate the armed forces, and especially the Pakistan Air Force, amongst the most respected institutions in the country.

Core values remind us of the price of joining the Pakistan Air Force, Army or Navy. They remind personnel, whether officers, airmen or civilians, to display honesty, courage, responsibility, openness, self-respect, and humility in the line of duty. Core values help us acknowledge rules, follow them faithfully, accept accountability and practice justice. They help us respect all personnel as fundamentally worthy. They instil a sense of discipline, self-control and faith in the system. By studying the core values we also eventually discover the importance of duty, honour, dedication, competence, and a host of other professional requirements and attributes. Just as they help us evaluate the pulse of our organization, core values also serve as beacons guiding us to the path of righteous conduct. Core values help us inculcate a culture of ethical commitment to our own service and the country.

The core values chosen by the Pakistan Air Force are those without which the Pakistan Air Force cannot perform as expected of it by the nation. These are the values that instil confidence, earn lasting respect, and create willing workers. More importantly, they are the values that buttress mental and physical courage when we enter combat. 

There is no limit on the number of core values that we can include in our list. Several militaries of the world go by just a single core value, usually enshrined in their mottoes. Many others prefer to have anywhere from three to seven core values. The Pakistan Air Force felt that it was a good idea to keep the list crisp and short, that is easy to remember, and which can be displayed as catchy reminders in the work centres. This also makes it that much easier to implement.

We have to remind ourselves that with a traditional adversary who can field a much larger array of lethal hardware and personnel in arms than us, the value system of the Pakistan Air Force must be so structured that it fortifies the potential of its fighting men and women.  This is bound to considerably offset any quantitative limitations of aircraft and weaponry, as has been clearly demonstrated in many a past conflict.  In short we are talking of force multipliers in the shape of highly motivated and dedicated professionals imbued with lofty values, to fight a future war.

Integrity

Let us start with integrity which is known as the bedrock of a value system in any organisation. Integrity is the soundness of moral principle, especially in relation to truth and fair dealing, uprightness, honesty and sincerity.  Integrity is all about people, and it has a direct bearing on what they give back to an organisation.

Integrity also means the condition of having no part of an element missing.  In other words, it means undivided, complete.  It implies oneness between words and actions.  People of integrity conform their words to their actions.  They tell the truth.  They practice what they preach.  They build the culture of trust. 

In the military, integrity has a special place; that is because the military is a very special profession – the profession of arms.  Military men are entrusted with the security of the nation.  The tools of their trade are lethal, and they engage in operations that deal with life and death.

Integrity is a character trait. It is the willingness to do what is right even when no one is looking. It is the inner voice, the voice of self-control and the basis for the trust imperative in today's military.

Integrity is the ability to hold together and properly regulate all of the elements of a personality. A person of integrity, for example, is capable of acting on conviction. A person of integrity can control deviant impulses and baser appetites.

A person of integrity possesses moral courage and does what is right even if the personal cost is high. Honesty is the hallmark of the military professional because in the military, our word must be our bond. A person of integrity is never irresponsible and acknowledges his or her duties and acts accordingly. A person of integrity does not try to shift the blame on others, or take credit for the work of others. A person of integrity practices justice.

To have integrity is also to respect oneself as a professional and a human being. A person of integrity does not behave in ways that would bring discredit upon himself or herself, or the organization to which he or she belongs.

Closely tied to integrity is the concept of honour. It is about keeping your word. It is conducting yourself in the highest ethical manner in dealing with colleagues, seniors and juniors. It is about allegiance to the organisation.

Integrity stands to be the most important core value for the Pakistan Air Force because lack of it – manifested by unethical practices – directly impacts operational readiness. A few examples might help to convey this point. 

Monthly, quarterly and annual reports and returns have been instituted by the Air Headquarters to help assess the goings-on in the field, so that a realistic picture emerges. Reports and returns are thus a most vital feedback to the planners.  Development plans, and more important, war plans are based on these reports and returns. Sometimes those in position of authority and responsibility lose sight of the importance of these vital statistics, and efforts are made to reflect that all is well.  This propensity feeds on the demands of the higher authorities, who are all too willing to bask in the glory and comfort that “everything is fine”.

Similarly, aircraft serviceability and reliability reports must not be just a thin veneer of efficiency of the Squadron, the Wing and the Base, but a true reflection of reality.  In armament results too, loopholes in the scoring system must not allow for bad scores to be glossed over.

Another area of concern is aircraft occurrences.  As the stakes are high for a pilot who is involved in an accident, lack of integrity sometimes shows through.  When the chips are down, the choice between concealing the truth and being forthright can get mixed-up, because we are all prone to making a choice that suits us most, or one that saves our skin, so to speak.  Incorrect narration of events, doctoring of aircraft data, and alteration of on-site evidence are known to have taken place on occasions. Incorrect findings and recommendations are bound to draw out wrong lessons and recourse to irrelevant remedial measures.   

The above-mentioned are some areas in Air Force operations where lack of integrity unnecessarily places lives and equipment at risk. One can extrapolate the consequences of such a situation on the operational readiness of the service.  Given that we are resource-constrained, every little counts, and we cannot afford to fritter away our combat potential due to any shortcoming in our value system.   Integrity is, therefore, the primary core value on which the very edifice of Pakistan Air Force rests.

Excellence

As a moral standard, excellence ordinarily means accomplishing the mission well. It means a determined effort in getting the job done right, and on time. The military function is so important and so exacting, that getting the job done demands more in the military than it does elsewhere. Mission failure in the military endangers national survival, and performing the military role requires capabilities and entails risks not found in other callings. For this reason, a standard of excellence is needed merely to get the job done in the military. Getting by with a minimal level of effort may suffice in the civil, but excellence is the only acceptable standard for accomplishing the military mission.

As a moral ideal, however, excellence demands more than mission accomplishment. Excellence also demands that men and women in uniform constantly produce better results. This is the meaning of ‘excel’: to surpass, to go beyond what is expected. As an ideal, excellence means exceeding the demands of duty to achieve results in excess of just getting the job done. Merely maintaining today’s standard, merely achieving today’s mission requirements, puts the military in danger of falling behind.  A technologically advanced service like the Air Force must be innovative to protect and promote the nation’s interests.  It must take risks, and must encourage others to take risks, to improve its organization, its procedures, and its doctrine. Excellence as ‘constant improvement’ is the goal of playing well and winning. To defend the nation, it is not enough to accomplish the mission. Endeavours must be made to find ways to excel, to go beyond mere mission accomplishment.

Excellence in all we do does not mean that we are excellent all the time. It just means that we try, and we try to do our best. Conformity is too easy. Mediocrity is too safe. Too many people settle for less than their best, and convince themselves that quality and integrity are negotiable. Remember, there are only two directions to move in life, either forward or backward. It is impossible to stand still; standing still means you are actually falling behind. To constantly see problems and challenges as opportunities involves a passion for excellence.

Excellence is closely dependent on merit, wherein appointments and responsibilities are assigned to individuals based upon their capabilities, namely intelligence, credentials, and education, determined through fair initial selection processes, and later, confirmed by the commanders through honest on-going evaluations. Excellence can only thrive in the absence of nepotism, cronyism and discrimination. It can flourish where everyone has a fair chance to put in his or her best. Only in such an environment can you live your life with a passion for excellence, where you can make a difference.

Excellence can flourish where everyone has a fair chance to put in his or her best. Only a passion for excellence can make a difference.  The old timers of the Pakistan Air Force tell us that the service was famous for laying a premium on merit. Cronyism and ‘sifarish’ were absolutely anathema to the senior commanders.  They ensured that only the most capable were given the opportunity to lead. That is how the small service came to be known for its excellence not just within the country, but far and wide. The famous air raids on Pathankot and Kalaikunda, and many a high-scoring dogfight were no chance walkovers, but were the outcome of the commanders accepting nothing but what was perfect, during peacetime. With such a legacy of excellence we must know that it is possible for Pakistan Air Force to repeat the great feats of daring.  

Mediocrity in performing our tasks would, in effect be a self-imposed handicap, which is tantamount to giving up when called by the nation to take up the challenge.  Striving for excellence is actually a fulfilment of the promise we made to the country.  This core value is bound to see us take up the challenge and fulfil our mission successfully, because we would have excelled at every step, previously.  Like integrity, excellence is a force multiplier par excellence.

Teamwork

One of the fundamental purposes of basic training, as we might remember from our Academy days, was to break down our notion of individuality, and instil us with a sense of teamwork. It may have sounded unreasonable having to take the blame for what others did, or carrying someone else's rifle along with one’s own, when he couldn’t press on during a field exercise.  However, we have a much better sense for the importance of teamwork now.

The fact of the matter is that the nature of what we do in the military is too complicated for us to succeed alone. This can be a hard concept in a society where individualism is often prized above all else, but we do not have to sacrifice our individuality to form a good team. We do, however, need to subordinate our sense of individuality to the greater goals of the team.

A team is composed of individuals, and it thrives on the talents and abilities they bring. Star players are always welcome on a team, so long as their contributions lift the team up, and not just themselves.

In a close-knit team, however, the adverse actions of an individual always reflect on, and hamper the performance of the group. Disciplinary problems are created by individuals, but they disproportionately afflict the team. 

Some people are not comfortable with the fact we must rely on others for our own success. Such characters do not belong in the military. The good part of learning to accept the importance of teamwork in our profession is that you share in successes which far exceed your individual ability to cause such effects.

Teamwork is much more efficient than individual endeavour. Working together and communicating means that military operations can be organized and properly coordinated. If everyone worked independently, there would be chaos.

More can be achieved as a team. Teamwork is synergy, or the synthesis of energies. In other words, it is the coming together of all participants for a common project goal. We only have to look at some social insects like ants and termites to see how their teamwork helps them in mega-projects that are beyond the individuals’ lifetime capacities. Quite obviously, teamwork also saves time, which is a reflection of economy of effort.

Working as a team means shared responsibility. Being in the military can be emotionally overwhelming at times, but working as a team means that you're not alone – you are surrounded by people who have experienced the same things as you have. This support and camaraderie is absolutely important in the military.

In a small service like the Pakistan Air Force, there is no room for individual, departmental or branch glory at the expense of collective accomplishment.  In every military service, there are branches organised to perform specialised tasks.  Personnel who undertake some of the more demanding or hazardous tasks, or those tasks that entail sophisticated expertise, have an understandable elitist air about them. The aviators of the air force, the tank-men of the army and the submariners of the navy are typical examples of those who consider themselves as the more important ones amongst their comrades.  Within limits of good sense and reason, this may not be a bad thing, but when it creates divisions within the services, it can have a diminishing effect from the overall effort put in by everyone. Such a schism, especially in a small service, is unacceptable.  As stated earlier, the nature of what we do in the military is too complicated for us to succeed alone.

A flier may think that he puts in more important work than anyone else, but remember that when all flying is over in the afternoon, the engineer gets to work supervising the maintenance, which can go on well into the night.  No aircraft can be declared airworthy for the next day till the engineer is satisfied, no matter how many extra man-hours it takes to support flying operations.

Similarly the air defenders and air traffic controllers are on duty surveilling the airspace, and controlling air traffic day and night, slugging it out in the field, and not infrequently, from remote locations. One can hardly think of other branches that rough it out more to support air operations.

Just as sporting teams, no player can claim to be more important than the others. Try playing without a goal-keeper or a full-back and you are sure to end up as a loser. It would, thus, be so much better to keep the overall mission of the air force in focus, and work together much like a sporting team – TEAM PAKISTAN AIR FORCE.  With such a team, the air force can punch much larger than its size, which is exactly what the prevalent circumstances demand.

Linkages with Other Values

It may have been noticed that each of the three values discussed has linkages with others, so omitting some of them does not really mean that the PAF has disregarded them completely. Honour and moral courage, for instance, are linked to integrity because a person cannot have integrity if he is disgraceful or cowardly.  Discipline and commitment have a direct connection with excellence, because a person who is not orderly in his methods, and who has no commitment to his organisation, can never excel.  Similarly, teamwork is possible only if the participants comprise the ingredients of respect and selflessness. These linkages help us narrow down the choice of core values that are straightforward, easy to comprehend and unproblematic from the point of view of their implementation.

Core Values as Leadership Tools

In sum, core values alongside the linked values are the common bond that surpass our ethnic, sectarian and provincial associations, and unify the Pakistan Air Force. These values help us identify with those who served the country with devotion and dedication. These values help us withstand the moral erosion that we witness around us, and help us get back to an environment of ethical commitment.

Most importantly, core values are an excellent guideline for leaders as well as commanders to emulate. It must be stressed that you do not have to wait to be a commander to be able to implement the core values. You can be a leader by following the core values and turning yourself into a role model, no matter what your rank. Leadership from below is as important as leadership from above in implementing the core values.

Conclusion

The core values that have been described are not the only way to look at them.  There are other philosophical interpretations of the core values, and it would also be instructive to examine them from perspectives offered by law, history, behavioural sciences, management theory, political science, religion, and so on. An analysis driven by the structure and the purpose of ethics and morality can be particularly useful for explaining the immense power of the core values. This discourse was just a first step and needs to be studied in greater depth.

Core values must be a major topic of education and training, not just at the Academies, but later on, at all centres of higher learning, as a continuum. Core values need to be taught at an early stage, and continuously reinforced throughout later service.  In addition, each one of us needs to take responsibility of engaging the sub-ordinates in discussions about what role these values play in Pakistan Air Force. While a ‘zero-defect’ air force may be the theoretical goal, a practical approach should focus on improving the ethical environment, no matter that we may not achieve it completely. It might seem too far-fetched that with the three core-values, the Pakistan Air Force will somehow encompass all dimensions of morality. However, the three simple words that have been spelt out are sufficient in themselves to make a change of magnitude that we can all be proud of. The three core values that Pakistan Air Force has chosen for itself can help it face challenges in view of factors like manpower, size, resource constraints, and technological sophistication. In essence it is all about men and women of the Pakistan Air Force, imbued with integrity, committed to excellence and sustained by teamwork. For a small, highly professional and technologically advanced air force, these core values can be a winning combination in the circumstances we find ourselves today.

03 August 2026

1971 War (Western Theatre) in a Nutshell





Unsure
 at the Helm

1.  Gen Yahya was reluctant to exercise military option as late as November 1971. In an address to NDC officers he stated, “I am not so stupid as to go to war with India. I will do my best for a political solution to avoid war." (Before, During, After Maj Gen Wajahat Hussain, Ferozsons Ltd.)

2.  Air Mshl Rahim Khan was in a vengeful and angry mood because of the massacre of 20 airmen and an officer of a Mobile Observer Unit in Mymensingh Jail, and also for the attempted hijacking of a T-33 by a Bengali instructor pilot that resulted in the death of the PAF student pilot.

3.  GHQ's Principal Staff Officers were not on speaking terms with each other. (Unlikely Beginnings, Maj Gen Mitha O A, Oxford University Press.)

4.  Following October parleys between Chinese senior leadership and Pakistani team which included Z A Bhutto, Lt Gen Gul Hassan, Air Mshl Rahim Khan and ambassador Sultan M Khan, Bhutto gave a completely misleading debrief to Yahya. While the Chinese had advised a political solution to the crisis, Bhutto told Yahya that Chinese had no idea about geo-politics and the parleys had been a waste of time. (Quoted by Sultan M Khan.)

Army’s Flawed Strategy

War preparations on the Pakistani side were seriously constrained by shortfalls in the Army’s fighting formations. The move of two infantry divisions from West Pakistan was clearly a short-term response to the deteriorating situation in East Pakistan; it gravely altered the balance in the West – the main theatre of war. Any operational reverses that might occur would have to be redressed by denuding the strategic reserves. Unfortunately, this meant that the very foundations of a Pakistani military response had been fatally weakened.

India’s defences, on the other hand were strong in all sectors, and she was confident of stopping any Pakistani foray, were Pakistan to attempt capture of vital territory as a sop for the loss of East Pakistan.

There was no possibility of a Pakistani offensive succeeding in the West because the reserve formations, ie II Corps and Army Reserve North (ARN) had been denuded of major portions of their armour, infantry and artillery elements for fire-fighting elsewhere.

        II Corps (1 Armd Div, 33 Inf Div, 7 Div)

-          124 Bde (ex-33 Div) to 8 Div for defence of Shakargarh Sector.

-          60 Bde (ex-33 Div) to 18 Div for defence of Naya Chor Sector.

  ARN (6 Armd Div, 17 Inf Div)

            -     17 Div Arty to 23 Div to bolster forces in Chamb.

-          66 Bde (ex-17 Div) to 23 Div to bolster forces in Chamb.

-     88 Bde (ex-17 Div) to 10 Div as ploy for offensive in Maqboolpur area.

-     7 Arm Bde (ex-6 Arm Div) to bolster forces in Chamb and Okara, reducing 6 Arm Div to an armoured brigade group.

Even if these strategic formations were at full strength, it would have taken weeks of slugging against equally powerful and similar-sized formations of the adversary. A superior relative strength ratio neither existed at the outset, nor was it possible to create, as all enemy sectors were very well defended. 

The critical situation in Shakargarh Sector and Naya Chor was threatening the heartland of Punjab and Sindh, and hence the very integrity of the country. It was just as well that the ARN or II Corps was not committed for any offensive operations at the outset, as their timely withdrawal, transfer and re-insertion in the threatened sectors would have been impossible, subsequently. A catastrophic situation was averted by not committing the reserves at the outset.

PAF’s Performance

1.  In Northern Sector, PAF, in concert with Army’s AAA, was able to achieve a favourable air situation and managed to remain a force in being.

2.  In Southern Sector, Air Defence was a hopeless cause from the outset due to limited air defence assets, and nil sensors for seaward air defence.

3.  Army AAA did an outstanding job in shooting down 60% of all IAF aircraft in West and East Pakistan.

4.  
Lip service was paid to naval support, as audacious and imaginative planning was lacking.  Destruction of the gunboat harbours on Saurashtra coast at the outset, as was done later against Okha harbour, could have prevented a rout.

5.  Offensive counter air operations against airfields caused optimal softening up. For 10% of the total effort, the degree of disruption was quite adequate and tied down IAF effort for air defence.

6.  Keeping no aircraft in Jacobabad for air support proved devastating for 18 Division in Longewala-Ramgarh Sector.  Half a squadron of F-6s placed in Mianwali turned out to be useless, and could have been operated from Jacobabad for:

        a.  Air Support in Ramgarh Sector (120 nm), which was within range of  F-6s, and was the          same distance as was flown from Sargodha to Shakargarh.

        b.  Air Defence of the vitally important Sui gas facility (45 nm).

        c.  Air Defence of Reti-RYK communications lifeline (100 nm).

Territory Lost in West Pakistan/Kashmir (Simla Agreement 4 Aug 1972)

1.   Pakistan lost 5,139 sq miles in Punjab and Sindh.

2.  India lost 69 sq miles in Punjab and Rajisthan.

3.   Pakistan retained 52 sq miles in Kashmir.

4.   India retained 480 sq miles in Kashmir.

      

01 August 2026

1965 War in a Nutshell





Pakistani Higher Leadership Mistakes

1.  Wrong assumption that a successful brigade-level operation in Rann of Kutch could be replicated in an all-out war.

2.   Hasty and insufficient preparations for Operation ‘Gibraltar’ (uprising in Kashmir).

3.  Big mistake in assuming that Operation ‘Gibraltar’ could succeed without taking Kashmiri local leaders into confidence for material and moral support, notwithstanding the demands of secrecy about the operation.

4.  President Ayub got talked into a wrong and self-serving assessment by Z A Bhutto (then Foreign Minister), and possibly by Maj Gen Akhtar Malik (Commander 12 Div), that Operation ‘Grand Slam’ (capture of Akhnur) would not result in retaliation across the international border.

5.  If Gen Musa disagreed with the government’s appreciation of India restricting the fight to Kashmir only (as he claimed in his book), he should have resigned.

6. Wrong appreciation by President Ayub that slowing down Operation ‘Grand Slam’ through replacement of energetic and unstoppable 12 Div Commander, Maj Gen Akhtar Malik, the imminent Indian offensive against Lahore could somehow be staved off. 

7.  With the launch of Operation ‘Grand Slam’, Pak Army should have been put on the highest alert in all sectors which was not done.

8.   Changing the PAF C-in-C just 40 days prior to war was a very risky thing to do, though it is another matter that Air Mshl Nur Khan learnt the ropes in no time.

Indian Higher Leadership Mistake

1.  Indian Army launched the main offensive on 6 Sep without air cover, allowing PAF to maul Indian offensive elements unhindered, till late afternoon.

PAF Leadership Mistakes

1.  Ill-considered decision to strike remaining airfields (Adampur & Halwara) after IAF had been alerted following the Pathankot raid on evening of 6 Sep.

2. Absolutely reckless decision to send para-dropped commandos to attack IAF bases, without any preparation or rehearsal whatsoever.

IAF Leadership Mistakes

1.  IAF fielded third-rate Vampire fighters for the opening round on 1 Sep in Chamb.

2. IAF failed to knock out PAF's main Sargodha airbase on the morning of 6 Sep before launch of India's main army offensive.

3.  IAF completely failed to intervene once its spearhead elements were being mauled on 6 Sep between Wagah and Batapur.

4.  IAF failed to safeguard its airfields on the opening day of the war. PAF raids on Pathankot and Kalaikunda (attacked a day later) were shocking and absolutely morale shattering for the IAF.

5.  IAF failed to adequately protect or disperse its aircraft assets at the bases, losing 39 aircraft on the ground, as against only one lost by PAF.

6.  High altitude bombing by Canberras was a useless tactic, borne of an overly cautious attitude in war. The total effort was a waste. 

PAF Leadership Brilliance

1.  Credit to previous C-in-C, Air Mshl Asghar Khan, for preparing sound war plans and ensuring most professional training.

2.  Credit to Air Mshl Nur Khan for putting PAF on highest alert when he sensed something was brewing.

3.  Credit to Air Mshl Nur Khan for flying risky missions at the outbreak of hostilities, to show that he was leading from the front.

4.  Credit to Squadron Commanders who led the most difficult missions, with three of them achieving martyrdom, four of them achieving as many as nine kills, and all ten of them getting gallantry awards.

5.  Squadron Commanders of the Pathankot and Kalaikunda raids (Sqn Ldr Sajad Haider and Sqn Ldr Shabbir H Syed) helped achieve the crowning glory of PAF’s combat performance, while Sqn Ldr M M Alam and Sqn Ldr Sarfaraz Rafiqui carried the day in the air.

6.  Credit to bomber pilots for carrying out very difficult and dangerous night raids, at low level in the face of ack ack.

______________________



30 July 2026

F-7MG Flight Trials

Gp Capt Kaiser Tufail and Wg Cdr Jamshed Khan were detailed to test fly the F-7MG (later known as F-7PG in PAF service) in July 1997.   A total of 12 sorties were planned in which the complete flight regime was to be explored, with particular focus on the improvements in performance of the already in-service F-7P (Chinese variant of the early model MiG-21F-13).  A similar number of sorties were to be flown after a few months, when the GEC-Marconi Super Skyranger radar was expected to be ready. PAF’s evaluation was the first by a prospective foreign customer, although the aircraft had accumulated almost 10,000 hours in the PLAAF since its induction in late 1995.

Soon after arrival in Chengdu, the wet tropical weather of Southern China made it quite obvious that the flight trials would take longer than expected.  Two other unusual challenges were the language barrier and the issue of finding enough airspace over non-populated areas.  Chengdu is one of China’s largest metropolitan centres and is located in Sichuan Province, which happens to have the country’s densest population per acre.  In such environments, supersonic flights as well as low-level max-speed trials left no room for area violation in the narrow sliver that had been allocated for flight trials. The pilots had also been told that their departure back home could be delayed in case the adjacent Chengdu International Airport was to lodge an air violation complaint. The hint was well registered!

Major Improvements

The F-7MG airframe has essentially the same F-7P fuselage, tailplane, fin, and inner wing sweepback of 57°.  The outer wing section incorporates the major change, with a reduced 42° sweepback and automatic leading edge manoeuvring flaps. The F-7MG is powered with an improved and more powerful WP-13 engine, which is also operational on the F-7III (Chinese variant of the MiG-21MF).  Additionally, cockpit layout, avionics and several ancillary systems have been changed, in line with modern trends.  The important systems that remain unchanged (compared to the F-7P) are the fuel system, weapons payload capacity and internal guns.

Double Delta Wings

Like the old Soviet Su-15, the Swedish J-35 Draken, as well as the more modern Rockwell/Deutsche Aerospace X-31 post-stall manoeuvring demonstrator, the F-7MG has a double-delta wing planform, which offers an excellent solution to a slender delta’s inherent low aspect ratio problem.  The aspect ratio of conventional deltas is, at best, of the order of about 2.4, with the low end notched up, surprisingly, by India’s Tejas. At 1.75 it stands behind the bat-winged double-delta Saab Draken, whose very low aspect ratio of 1.8 was considered to be a convenient remedy to the transonic Centre of Pressure (CP) shift, albeit at the expense of overall aerodynamic efficiency.  In contrast, the F-7MG has an aspect ratio of 2.8.

Wing tip stalling has never been an issue on the F-7P, but the double delta wing brings with it an added bonus in this respect.  The strong vortex of the inner wing re-energises the boundary layer of the outer wing, preventing span-wise flow towards the tips.  This allows even more carefree manoeuvring at ultra-low speeds.

Testing the Wings

On the first take-off, it was evident that the aircraft was impatient to get off the ground and had to be held down to prevent it from getting airborne prematurely.  Compared to the F-7P’s take-off speed of 310 kph, the MG lifted off at 280 kph with ease and the advertised 35% improvement in take-off distance was on the mark.  The sight of the auto-manoeuvring flaps at work reminded the pilots of the F-16’s computer-controlled leading edge devices. Packaging the servo motors and actuators within the thin leading edge without the tell-tale bulges has certainly been a marvel of engineering at Chengdu Aircraft Corporation (CAC).

The feel of the aircraft was smooth in all domains, none more so than in transonic flight.  As expected, CP shift was minimal and both the test pilots were unanimous about the decrease in stick forces. Transonic being an important combat flight regime, this is a welcome improvement.

A good measure of a wing’s lifting efficiency is at high angles to the incident airflow, as in tight turns or slow speeds.  What better than to pace the MG through a slow speed loop?  Normally, a safe entry speed for a loop on the F-7P would be between 800-900 kph (at 15,000 AMSL).  In the absence of any guidelines on a slower version of the manoeuvre, it was decided to try 700 kph at first.  The MG went through smoothly without any hint of judder or slip at the top.  With full faith in the leading edge flaps, the next loop was performed at 600 kph.  Again, the same results were achieved and the aircraft went through a perfect loop without any jitter or judder.  At lower altitudes it might have done even better, but airspace limitations at Chengdu did not permit low level aerobatics.

Several flights followed the first check of the aircraft’s aerodynamic efficiency.  It was a most pleasant surprise to note that the turn rates were nearer to the F-16 at medium to high altitudes, and were exactly as advertised.  A 33% improvement over the F-7P at 5,000’ AMSL, 50% at 10,000’ and 66% at 20,000’ would certainly call for an end to the “supersonic sports plane” sobriquet that dogged the F-7MG’s forerunners.

The results of the flight trials were so encouraging that the test pilots were tempted to simulate a flamed-out engine landing pattern, a not very done thing on delta-winged fighters.  While the Chinese flight manuals suggested a rectangular pattern that can put one’s judgement and nerves to test, the standard overhead spiral pattern was tried out initially from a high-key height of 15,000’ AGL.  With engine idling and speed brakes out to simulate a dead engine, the aircraft glided much like the F-16, so after a few approaches, the high-key height was lowered to 12,000’ AGL.  The sink rate was well under control, and in fact was so well manageable that all later sorties were terminated through practice dead-engine approaches.  At 1:8.5, the glide ratio compares favourably with some of the modern Western fighters.

Landings on the F-7MG could be made at 270 kph, compared to about 290 kph on the F-7P.  Both the test pilots felt that the speed could be lowered further, were it not for the length of the gear struts, which are not long enough to allow a higher nose attitude, and could result in a tail scrape.  Hydraulic brakes, though still hand-held (like those on a bicycle handle-bar), were very effective, and the unlimited braking facility was a welcome improvement over the somewhat restricted pneumatics of the F-7P.

New Engine

The WP-13F engine of the F-7MG produces 1,200 lbs more thrust than the F-7P’s  WP-7, giving it a thrust-to-weight ratio of about .9 compared to .8 of the latter in clean take-off configuration.  A 50% improvement in spool-up time was found to be a welcome feature, particularly on final approach and landing phases where a rapid go-around may be necessitated for any reason.  With a faster engine spool-up, a bad landing is actually a thing of the past on the MG. Use of titanium alloys in compressor blades and an increased Time Between Overhauls (TBO) are indicators of improvements in Chinese jet-engine technology.

The thrust increase was evidenced by a 25% improvement in acceleration time from 500 kph to 1100 kph and an equally impressive time-to-climb to 36,000’ AMSL. All improvements were verified and were found to be as advertised or even better.  Even more remarkable was the fact that these trials took place in hot and humid weather, well outside the 15°C, 1013 hP environments in which the specifications are usually ‘engineered’ by the manufacturer.

Miscellaneous Systems

Used to advanced cockpits of the F-16, both test pilots were quick to point out several ergonomic improvements, and had detailed discussions with CAC design bureau.  Switchology changes and relocation of several instruments led to a much improved cockpit. These changes include a Stores Management System, which is a useful cockpit-pilot interface to help establish the status of stores including configuration, fusing and weapon codes, etc. A voice warning system, colour video recorder, elaborate cockpit lighting and a more precise and jitter–free Angle Of Attack (AOA) probe are nice-to-have improvements.  The coloured Electronic Flight Instrument System (EFIS) includes two displays, one for the attitude indicator and the other for the heading and navigation sub-systems like ADF, VOR, TACAN, ILS etc.

Radar

The F-7MG was originally designed to have the GEC-Marconi Super Skyranger.  At the time of initial PAF trials the radar was not ready.  Trials were held again several months later after the prototype radar was installed.  In the event the radar did not come up to PAF specifications and GEC-Marconi was not able to surmount the problems associated with the small nose cone, including antenna size and equipment air-conditioning which was insufficient.

The PAF eventually retrofitted their F-7Ps and F-7PGs with the FIAR Grifo-7.  To say that miniaturisation technology is at its best in this marvellous Italian radar would be an understatement.  With an excellent pulse Doppler radar having respectable ranges and a medium order azimuth and elevation scan, the system is married to the all-aspect AIM-9L Sidewinder missiles, making it a lethal combination.

FT-7PG

CAC did not design a dual-seat version of the F-7MG.  On PAF’s request, the existing FT-7P cockpit was redesigned on lines of the PG to ensure standardisation and the resultant dual seater was re-designated FT-7PG.

Post-script

The F-7MG has considerably improved subsonic and transonic flight performance.  Coupled with excellent turning capability and acceleration, the combat potential is enhanced tremendously.  The Grifo-7/AIM-9L combination on board PAF’s F-7PG brings the aircraft closer to the F-16 in close combat capabilities, and the PAF must be credited with extracting the maximum from an innovatively redesigned low-cost fighter.

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ASPECT RATIO AND AERODYNAMIC EFFICIENCY

Creating lift in an aircraft incurs an unavoidable penalty in the form of induced drag. Aerodynamic efficiency is achieved by designing a wing that produces maximum lift for the least drag. This is done by having a high ‘aspect ratio,’ which is the ratio of the square of the wingspan to the wing area. Since induced drag is inversely proportional to the aspect ratio, greater the wingspan, lower the induced drag. A high aspect ratio is thus an important factor in combat, as it helps in sustaining turn rates. High aspect ratio also improves endurance and ceiling and, shortens take-off/landing distances.

As fighters become faster, their aspect ratios have to be reduced to minimise profile drag for supersonic flight. This is done by presenting a smaller frontal area to the supersonic airflow with the help of a smaller wingspan, besides other profile streamlining techniques. It can thus be seen that the conflicting requirements of high-speed flight and subsonic manoeuvring flight have a bearing on the aspect ratio and, compromises invariably result.

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Exchanging notes with a Chinese test pilot.

Taxying out for the first sortie.




Lift-off.


Chute good!







Debriefing a CAC engineer.

PAF team with CAC engineers.

26 February 2021

IAF's Balakot Disaster Two Years On

As with any political party in power, the Indian elections of 2019 were critical for Bharatya Janata Party (BJP), for it wanted a stronger showing than its previous term in power. The issues of rising unemployment, currency demonetisation, farmers’ complaints of low remunerative prices, and not the least, the persistent insurgency in Kashmir had, however, dented BJP’s prospects considerably. Something needed to be done to avert a poor show at the hustings. Pakistan, perceived as India’s perennial nemesis, was the perfect scapegoat which could be accused of supporting the uprising in Muslim-majority Kashmir. BJP assessed that targeting Pakistan on charges of supporting terror in Kashmir would be fully supported by both sides of the political divide in India. According to the Pew Research Centre, their 2018 and 2019 surveys suggested that the significant majority of the Indian voters considered Pakistan as a “very serious threat” to their country, and terrorism to be a “very big problem.”

On 14 February 2019, a Kashmiri youngster carried out a suicide attack by ramming his car into a police vehicle, killing 40 troops of Central Police Reserve Force. The attack was in retaliation for the excesses committed by para-military forces, which had tortured and maimed hundreds of young men, and raped scores of women in a relentless campaign of terror. Instead of reflecting on the causes of the on-going insurgency, the Modi government found it opportune to blame Pakistan yet one more time.  Without an iota of evidence to present to UN or any other world adjudication body regarding involvement of Pakistan in the attack, the Indian government decided to exact revenge on its own. With elections just six weeks away, the timing could not have been more favourable for Prime Minister Modi.

IAF struck a purported terrorist training camp at Jabba, near Balakot town early morning on 26 February. Fortuitously for Pakistan, the brazen attack started with a string of failures, which continued embarrassingly throughout the operation. Of the planned package of twelve Mirage 2000H which were to strike, two aborted on the ground, while four had to abort in the air due to cloudy weather which precluded use of the electro-optically delivered ‘Crystal Maze’ bombs. The remaining six Mirages delivered their ‘Spice 2000’ bombs from a stand-off range of 40 km; five bombs exploded on a hillside, well away from the target, which was actually a seminary that housed teenage children learning to memorise the Holy Quran. There was no loss of any life or property.

IAF stood guard on the night of 26 February when PAF’s riposte was expected. Extensive Combat Air Patrols (CAP) were flown by IAF, with surveillance support from ground radars, as well as an AEWCS aircraft anchored over Adampur.   When PAF did not show up till sunrise of 27 February, IAF eased off from its highest alert state, and waited for the following night.  A pair of Su-30MKI was patrolling near Srinagar, while a pair of Mirage 2000I was patrolling east of Udhampur.   PAF’s deception worked splendidly when its strike package of four Mirage 5PA/IIIDA and two JF-17, duly supported by a big swarm of escorts and patrolling fighters (a mix of F-16A/B and JF-17), cluttered the scopes of IAF’s ground radars at 0920 hours. Working at the rear of the fighter package were PAF’s SAAB Erieye AEWC aircraft, and the DA-20 Falcon in which electronic warfare wizards sat ready with their arcane tricks.

Two vintage – but still quite capable – Mirage 5PA, each armed with one H-4 stand-off  bomb, along with two JF-17, each armed with two Mk-83 Range Extension Kit (REK) bombs, headed towards their respective targets in southern-western Indian-Held Kashmir (IHK).  Each Mirage 5PA was followed by its communication control aircraft, a dual-seat Mirage IIIDA, which was to steer the H-4 after launch through data link, while the JF-17s’ Mk-83 REK were to be launched in the autonomous ‘fire and forget’ mode. Since the purpose of the mission was essentially to demonstrate that Pakistan had the resolve, as well as the capability of responding in kind, it was decided that there was no compelling need to pick the front door of a brigade commander’s office, or the air shafts of soldiers’ bunkers. General area bombing of open spaces in military garrisons near the Line of Control (LOC) in IHK was, therefore, agreed upon.  It was expected that this ‘abundance of restraint’ would prevent mass carnage in the Indian military garrisons, which could otherwise lead to a chain of escalatory actions, and spiral into a very dangerous all-out war under a nuclear overhang.  When PAF struck the garrisons within 32 hours of IAF’s abortive air strike at Balakot, it came like a ‘shot across the bow’ and had the desired sobering effect on the Indian military commanders.  

Meanwhile, the pair of patrolling Su-30s were completely shocked when they were targeted by an F-16 with an AIM-120 missile at long range. Narrowly surviving an apparent proximity hit, both Su-30s scampered out of the area, leaving the field to the Mirage 2000 pair. When the IAF ground radar sought to position the Mirages to tackle the F-16s, both terror-stricken Mirage pilots expediently declared fire-control system malfunctions, and also bowed out without a fight. The desperate ground radar control then scrambled two pairs of MiG-21 Bison to tackle the rampaging PAF fighters. It was not long before an F-16 fired an AIM-120 missile at one of the Bisons that was charging in headlong, rather recklessly. The Bison was promptly blown out of the skies; its pilot, Wg Cdr Abhinandan, was lucky to parachute to safety, and was promptly apprehended by Pak Army soldiers inside Pakistani territory.

While air combat was in progress in the skies, an IAF combat search and rescue Mi-17 helicopter holding in the combat zone was shot down with a Spyder SAM, as the Terminal Air Defence Unit radar at Srinagar took it for a Pakistani UAV. The costly mistake resulted in six aircrew fatalities. For the IAF, it seemed like a morning of endless misfortunes.

India had the initiative, and could also exploit the element of secrecy and surprise to its advantage. However,  these possible benefits were squandered by the IAF as the operation was flawed in its planning, and entirely disastrous in its execution. Some of the basic planning considerations were flouted: cloudy weather resulted in cancellation of the electro-optical weapons delivery, elevation data fed into the autonomous Spice 2000 bombs was in error, capabilities of the PAF’s BVR air-to-air missiles were not well-known to IAF aircrew, and the determination as well as the state of readiness of PAF was taken lightly.  More serious was the failure of IAF’s patrolling fighters to pick up the gauntlet when challenged, allowing PAF fighters to have a free run; it reflected poorly on the morale and training of IAF pilots. Oversight of the operation was faulty at all levels of command, and cannot be put down to bad luck by an air force that claims to be professional.

It is a wonder that despite such a fruitless operation, the Indian media painted it as a great victory. Fabrications knew no bounds when an F-16 was claimed to have been downed by Abhinandan. The Indian pilot had truthfully claimed on TV – while sipping a ‘fantastic’ cup of Pakistani tea – that he was still searching for the target on his radar when he got zapped by an air-launched missile. Apparently, the Bollywood habituated Indian public least bothers about fact-checking, and two years down, continues to revel in the ‘great victory,’ despite a most discomfiting rout. It must be confessed, however, that media manipulation was the only success of Modi’s government.

The reaction of the international community to India’s brazen aggression against Pakistan was muted, and outright condemnation was absent. The closest any country got to disapproval was a neither here nor there statement, calling 'all parties to exercise restraint.' In an environment where freedom movements are labelled as terror campaigns – as in Indian occupied Kashmir and Palestine – it is not difficult for the host governments to justify punitive action against suspected supporters.  Pakistan needs to be wary of this reprehensible trend, and needs to be at the diplomatic forefront to quell hostile propaganda by its adversaries, especially India.

Though the failed IAF strike did not bring any concrete dividends, it did open up the possibility for India to repeat such action in future. The mistakes made in planning and execution of 26/27 February 2019 operation are certain to have been remedied, and it would be naïve to believe that India is not raring for a revenge bout. India has never digested the fact that its military options against Pakistan have been limited by the latter’s nuclear capability. To keep an upper hand as a regional player, India is likely to resort to periodic muscle-flexing through so-called ‘surgical strikes.’ These could be conducted with stand-off weapons launched by conventional fighters, or more likely by Unmanned Combat Aerial Vehicles (UCAV), which may be the new norm in Indo-Pak conflicts. Pakistani military, especially the quick-reacting PAF, needs to maintain its operational readiness at the cutting edge to deter India from any adventurism in future.

© KAISER TUFAIL

This article was published (under a different heading) in Pakistan Politico, February 2021 issue.