The 1965 War resulted in immediate sanctions imposed by the USA on both India and Pakistan. Explaining the sanctions, the White House Special Advisor on South Asia, Robert Komer stated that, “In the light of UN appeals, we [USA] cannot be in the position of adding fuel to the flames …. It may well help bring home to both [India and Pakistan], the consequences of their folly.” Most affected by the sanctions was PAF, whose complete inventory was of US origin. With the spares supply suddenly stopped, the operational capability of PAF started to nosedive. The C-in-C at that time, Air Marshal Nur Khan, sensed the criticality of the situation, and started an immediate search for suitable combat aircraft from new and dependable sources.
For Pakistan, the prevalent geopolitical realities restricted most of the available options. Pakistan’s CENTO membership hardly endeared her to the Soviets. The Indians had already made inroads to Moscow, and the first shipment of six MiG-21s had made their operational debut during the 1965 war.
The Soviets saw India not only as a socialist ideologue that could be helped militarily, but as its influential proxy and mouthpiece in the Non-Aligned Movement. The prospect of Soviets and Pakistanis developing any kind of patron-client linkage, thus, came to be a non-starter.
China, in the throes of the Cultural Revolution, had not shown much interest in developing newer aircraft technologies for the time being. Content with the copy of Soviet-supplied MiG-19s, China mass-produced this single-role fighter-interceptor (renamed F-6) in thousands. When Pakistan approached China for military help immediately after the 1965 War, she was only too glad to offer the F-6 to the new friend, with the initial batch of 60 being free of cost. Several more batches were procured at a very affordable price.
Another quick-fix solution was found in the shape of 90 ex-Luftwaffe Canadair Sabre Mk-6 (called F-86E in PAF), which was a more powerful Canadian version of the North American Aviation F-86F. The deal was sealed in 1966 with the help of Iran, which had agreed to be the bogus buyer of West Germany’s used fighters; this subterfuge was to bypass any objections which India was bound to stir up, had the deal been open and direct. It was expedient too, for the US administration to look the other way as Pakistan was still a CENTO and SEATO partner, having provided useful aerial spying services against the Soviet Union.
A total of 24 modern Dassault Mirage IIIE/R/D procured from France in 1968 were the newest and most advanced addition to PAF’s combat aircraft inventory. Besides performing a wide variety of missions, the Mirages could generate a higher daily sortie rate compared to the much older F-86s, F-104s and B-57s. They could navigate accurately to relatively deeper targets at low level, and after the attack, egress at high speed.
It goes to the credit of Air Marshal Nur Khan for having inducted more than 200 aircraft in PAF, within three years of the 1965 War. This 60% boost in aircraft numbers within a very short period put pressure on the pilots’ training programme; however, PAF was up to the challenge, and the pilots had full command over their new steeds in no time. Alongside these latest acquisitions, PAF had the aging F-86F and F-104A/B fighters, and B-57B/C bombers which were already second-hand aircraft belonging to USAF or air forces of partner nations, and had been transferred to Pakistan under the US Military Assistance Program.
The 1971 War triggered another round of US military sanctions against Pakistan, this time on dubious charges of ‘human rights violations’ in erstwhile East Pakistan. In the face of continual sanctions, Pakistan found it sagacious to look for non-US sources of military hardware. Starting in 1973, and spread over a decade, PAF added 72 additional Mirage III/5s to its inventory. Alongside these modern acquisitions from France, PAF also procured more F-6s, and later its strike variant, the A-5, from China. Happily, both suppliers turned out to be reliable, and PAF regained balance in the face of ‘on-off’ sanctions. Two more spells of US sanctions followed: one for signing a deal with France for a nuclear reprocessing plant (1977), and another for manufacturing gas centrifuges for a uranium enrichment plant at Kahuta (1979).
With the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979, the US saw Pakistan as a useful conduit for material support to the Mujahideen, and once again started to cozy up by lifting the sanctions. US clearance to sell what was then the world’s best fighter, was a windfall for Pakistan by all standards, though a cause of considerable consternation in the South Asian neighborhood. Starting in 1983, PAF received its first batch of 40 F-16A/Bs. Pakistan duly returned the favor by facilitating US goals of evicting the Soviets from Afghanistan. Throughout the war, Pakistan provided air and land bridges to support deployed US forces in Afghanistan. When the Soviets had been driven out after a decade of occupation in Afghanistan, and USA’s work was done to its satisfaction, the latter had no qualms about springing the sanctions surprise on Pakistan yet again. In 1990, the US President decided against certifying to the Senate about non-possession of a nuclear device by Pakistan.
For Pakistan, the ignominy of the loss of its eastern wing in the 1971 War had underscored the importance of an iron-clad defense, which only a nuclear deterrent offered. Pakistan had clandestinely progressed to weapons grade know-how, and there was no going back. Having dealt with five sanctions regimes in a quarter of a century, Pakistan had learnt its marbles well, and could handle more. These came in quick succession, on charges of carrying out nuclear tests by a non-nuclear state (1998), and a military coup against an elected government (1999). Incredibly, there seems no let-up in the coercive sanctions regime, with the most recent stoppage of aid resulting from inability of the US Secretary of State to certify Pakistan’s cooperation in anti-terrorism efforts (2018). Clearly, US sanctions have been brandished as a leverage tool, to be employed as and when required in this rather granular partnership.
Over the years PAF has learnt to tackle the ebb and flow of US support with a two-pronged approach. It has diversified the sources of its hardware, and has progressively striven for self-sufficiency.