24 April 2020

Risalpur Diaries

The first day of 1974 saw 39 of us from 60th GD (P) Course arriving at PAF Academy, Risalpur.  This was the dream place we all had longed for, as many a PAF legend had passed through its hallowed halls, classrooms and flight lines.  We still had three more months to go in the second term before we could fit into the scheme of things at the Academy.  For some reason, our tenure at the Initial Training Wing at Lower Topa had been cut short, and we were to complete the remaining term as the junior-most cadets at Risalpur.  This was quite a let-down, for we had been enjoying full authority and complete freedom in the most salubrious environs of Murree Hills, just a few days earlier.  The only consolation was that the state of affairs at Risalpur was said to be more ‘mature,’ whatever that meant.
We were accommodated in one of the three U-Blocks in the Cadets’ Mess.  Each room had a bunk bed for two, along with a study table and a chair.  The Mess was bifurcated by a road, with the cadets’ accommodation on one side, and the dining hall, ante-rooms and the Under Officers’ Block for the senior appointment holders, on the other.  The road in between was, unbelievably, a thoroughfare with airmen and civilians loitering around merrily at all times of the day and night.  The Mess premises had no boundary wall around it, as security was never felt to be an issue in the cantonment area. The cadets could wander off to the nearby ‘casino,’ a ramshackle canteen for army soldiers that served jalebis, rusks and tea.  The Cadets’ Mess tea bar, run by the strict and authoritarian bartender Abdul Rauf, popularly known as ‘Maulana,’ was out of bounds for any cadet who was not dressed up properly, so the casino was a convenient hangout for some of the slothful types.
As the junior-most term at the Academy, we were subjected to the usual shouting and cursing, withdrawal of petty privileges, and periodic punishments for no rhyme or reason. Interestingly, the same treatment was being meted out to our immediate seniors from 59th GD (P) Course, who still had over a year to climb to the top rung.  For us, the irony of it all was to watch our previous tormentors receive their payback, one frog jump at a time!
Not long after settling down, we found ourselves on the parade square, when not at the Directorate of Studies.  The graduation parade of 57th GD (P) Course was not too far, and practice started in earnest rather early.  Perhaps we had been called in from Lower Topa prematurely to pack the parade square to capacity, as the President of Pakistan was to review the parade.
The Directorate of Studies was headed by a seasoned educationist, Wg Cdr Muhammad Shamim.   Some of the new subjects that we got introduced to included aerodynamics, aero-engines, armament, electronics, meteorology and navigation.  Since these subjects had a direct bearing on our future careers as pilots, all of us evinced keen interest, much to the satisfaction of our worthy education instructors. A Bachelor’s degree in Aero-sciences to go along with the coveted flying badge remained everyone’s ultimate goal.
A welcome activity at the Directorate of Studies was the tea break at 11 o’clock, when a horse-drawn tonga would arrive at the edge of the parade square with a huge samovar filled with tea, along with a container of crockery.  Tea would be served on a table laid out by a Cadets’ Mess waiter.  Some of the smokers would drift off and draw some quick puffs in the company of seniors, hoping to endear themselves to someone who could make their lives easier.
The strident drone of the T-6G, and the high-pitched whine of the T-37 soon started to sound like music to our ears and we would look skywards, hoping to fly these birds someday.  Anwar Amil, originally a course senior but relegated to ours, was a great air enthusiast.  He was always ready to fire us up with stories of air wars, complete with sound effects of roaring jets and staccato cannon fire.  During tea breaks, we used to be all ears listening to his instructor-like comments about the accuracy, or otherwise, of aircraft flying in the circuit pattern.  A fine artist, he would spend the study periods drawing fighter aircraft, always portraying himself in full pilot’s gear next to the aircraft, or in the cockpit.  His interest in aviation stemmed from his past job as a flight despatcher in Alitalia, while he was in England earlier.
One day in February, an excited Amil broke the news to us that he had talked a senior of 58th GD (P) Course into arranging a guided tour of the Primary Flying Training (PFT) Wing.  The senior was a suspended cadet by the name of Rafique (fondly known as paahh, or ‘brother’ in Punjabi), and was Under Disposal (UD) pending adjustment in another branch of the PAF.  What kind of coordination Rafique had done was not known to us, but on his go-ahead, Amil marched our course from the Directorate of Studies to the Flying Wing.  Nearing the flight lines, we spotted rows of yellow T-6G Harvards on the tarmac, and we imagined flying them in the not too distant future.  As we reached the Wing building, we spotted a few flying instructors sitting on the steps, with their zippers open at the neck mocking the prescribed limits; some were smoking, blowing puffs in our faces from a distance.  Amil brought the flight to attention and saluted the instructors.  “What brings you here?” asked one of them.  Before Amil could answer, one of the burly instructors shouted, “Start running around the block if you guys have nothing better to do.”  It seemed quite a disappointment, and we wondered what had gone wrong. After half an hour of running – with some frog-jumping to break the tedium – one of the angry-looking instructors emerged from the crew room and gave us a shouting. “You guys can’t even tell the front side of an aircraft from its back side.  How dare you disgrace the Flying Wing?  Get lost. We don’t want to see your faces till you are in the fourth term.” After the dressing down, a sheepish Amil led us back to the Directorate, where he was taunted by all of us.  Amil’s intense enthusiasm for flying was cut short, unfortunately, when he could not pass his end-term examinations, and had to be withdrawn from the Academy.
Character Building and Leadership (CBL) was a subject handled by officers from the Cadets’ Wing, and was more of a general discourse on their experiences in the PAF. Sqn Ldr Malik Iftikhar, a navigator, used to conduct CBL classes.  We found him somewhat enigmatic, for he had the knack of instilling fear in us, even though he could be smiling about something.  He had been a PAF boxer, and was well-known for his winning left hook in many a championship.  It was no wonder that he had earned the sobriquet of jabra torr (jaw breaker) amongst the cadets.  During one boring CBL class, I was dared by my course-mate, Zafar Iqbal, to digress and bring up the subject of boxing. Making use of a rather long pause in Sqn Ldr Iftikhar’s talk, which I took to be the end of the lecture, I asked him if he could tell us about his boxing experiences.  He smiled but said nothing. I continued by asking if he had been the PAF champion, to which he nodded in the affirmative. “You must have broken lot many jaws,” I promptly followed up. There was a hush in the class. My jaw dropped too.  Sqn Ldr Iftikhar was amused by my boldness, and he managed to put on his puzzling smile.  Raising his hand, with two fingers forming the victory sign, he continued to look at me. I could not figure out what exactly he meant, but I thought it was about his boxing wins.  Still smiling, he had second thoughts. “Make it five,” he said, stretching his outspread palm. “What sir?” I asked. “Restrictions, my friend.  I will see you on extra drill today in the afternoon!” I could do nothing but blame Zafar who had prompted me, while he had a good laugh at the incident.

After months of daily drill practice, the graduation parade of 57th GD (P) Course was finally held on 6 April, 1974.  The reviewing officer was the President of Pakistan, Mr Fazal Elahi Choudhry.  For us, it meant promotion to the third term, denoted by three thin stripes on the epaulettes. A more momentous promotion followed a few weeks later, when the Academy Commandant, Air Cdre Zulfiqar Ali Khan, was nominated as Chief of the Air Staff. The last we had inter-acted with Air Cdre Zulfiqar was on the dining-out for the graduating course, when he told us that he was about to retire shortly.  Instead, he rose to the next three ranks in the new appointment in quick succession, which we found very inspirational. Air Cdre Shuja’at-ullah Khan, a course-mate of the previous Commandant took charge as the new one.
A modest privilege that we earned in the third term was the facility of a bicycle to and from the Cadets’ Mess and the Directorate of Studies, instead of having to walk down all the way.  These bicycles were traditionally hand-me-down items purchased from, or gifted by the graduating courses.  Other than that, not much had changed, as we continued to be the junior-most course, though a new set of cadets from 58th GD (P) Course had moved into the final term.  As expected, they gradually started to wield absolute authority, albeit at our expense.
Our course got an early taste of heartless behaviour of the senior cadets when one of them, by the name of Ghazanfar, decided to test his uncertain confidence levels by conducting a punishment assembly, one Sunday morning. Citing absence from a previously ordered assembly as the reason, he ragged the course to insane limits.  A punishing fitness exercise involving a clap over the head followed by a rapid squat (locally termed as 5BX, or Five Basic Exercises of the Canadian Air Force Fitness Plan), was ordered to be performed one-thousand times.  Rest periods involved protracted squatting on the heels, which was no less painful. The ridiculous activity lasted for the better part of the day, and even went on into the night.  Pleased with his poise and authority, Ghazanfar finally let go of our course which, by then, had blessed him with a thousand curses between the lips.

Not long after the 5BX episode, a revolt of sorts took place when cadets of our course got fed up with the final term cadets of 58th GD (P) Course, whose constant harangue about our turnout and haircuts had become intolerable.  “I don’t want to see a single hair on your rotten heads by tomorrow afternoon,” shouted ‘Munoo,’ during a punishment assembly conducted by him.  ‘Munoo’ was one of those affable seniors who, once in a while, felt the need to stand tall in front of his juniors.  Our course, led by the activist Ayuk Elburz, immediately went into a huddle and came up with the idea of retorting with a head shave. An oath was drafted by another firebrand, Ashiq Hussain, during classes next day, and signatures were obtained pledging to remain true to the decision of a ‘zero cut’ for everyone.
Soon after pack-up time, there was a rush for the barber shop, and the head barber was instructed by Ayuk and his confederates to shear off the hair from the forty-odd heads, in as many minutes.  As the three barbers got to work, some of the course-mates started to get cold feet and slipped away with flimsy excuses, like ‘feeling hungry, will be back after a quick lunch.’ They were hoping that some informant would blow the whistle in the meantime, and the officers would promptly intervene.  Sure enough, officers of the Cadets’ Wing came rushing in no time, and put a stop to the unprecedented mass shearing at the barber shop. The head barber – who had the compulsive habit of clenching his tongue between the teeth while negotiating uneven contours of his subject’s scalp – turned ashen-faced.  The poor chap feared that his barber shop contract might be terminated for violating the cadets’ regulation hairstyle.
An inquiry was ordered and thirteen cadets who had gone under the barbers’ clippers were in the dock.  Termination of cadetship loomed, but the authorities had their own jobs to save, lest the Air Headquarters took a dim view of their command and control abilities.  A series of punitive actions were taken against the errant thirteen: the group, informally christened as ‘G’ Flight (G, as in Ganja), was to be on daily extra drill till further notice, had to keep running around the athletics track during the daily games period, had to forego all entertainment facilities like TV and billiards, and had to eat alongside the Mess staff in a shabby veranda behind the dining hall.  When the Annual All-Collegiate Declamation Contest started after a few days, ‘G’ Flight was ordered to stay completely out of sight of the visiting participants and guests.
During the relentless punishment sessions, cadets of ‘G’ Flight had built up good strength and stamina, as was evidenced by their outstanding performance during the Inter-Squadron Cross-Country Competition.  The authorities were, thus, forced to rethink about the open-ended penance.  Also, the whole episode had become too embarrassing, what with ‘G’ Flight becoming the laughing stock of passers-by on the roads, as well as cadets’ weekend visitors. ‘G’ Flight was thus disbanded, and all punishments were ceased, with a stern warning that any future incident of such nature would be treated as a mutiny, with serious consequences.
Conjecture leads one to believe that a course-mate of ours had figured for himself, that the upcoming Declamation Contest was a good opportunity to charm some of the female contestants.  Perhaps the Romeo had been grooming himself for the occasion for weeks, and did not want to put off the girls with the missing plumage on his crown.

In the month of June, the Inter-Base Swimming Championship was held, and some of the cadets got a chance to represent Risalpur. Though the championship went to PAF Base Korangi, Risalpur were the runners up, with me and Asif Rehman  bagging five trophies.  My second position in the gruelling one mile free-style race earned me a position in the PAF team for the Inter-Services Swimming Championship, held a few weeks later.  Needless to state, the Army participants were far more prepared, and there was a total rout at the Engineers Bridging Pit – which is what the Olympics-size pool was properly called.
        Shortly before the summer vacations in July 1974, we learnt that the top ten cadets from 61st GD (P) had been promoted to our course.  These lucky ten were fast-tracked into the third term by foregoing their summer break, and stretching their classes well into the evenings.  This was done with some urgency by the Air Headquarters when there was talk of substantial infusion of US military aid. The aid package was supposed to include F-5 fighters and A-7 attack aircraft, which would have entailed training of a large number of pilots.  In the event, there was no military aid, but our course ran into a healthy competition with the new-comers.
During summer vacations in July, we attended a week-long Physiological Indoctrination Course run by the Aero-Medical Institute, at PAF Base Masroor.  It was an important introduction to subjects like dysbarism, hypoxia, hyperventilation and spatial disorientation, which were some of the phenomena we could encounter in flying.  There was demonstration of some bodily functions that could go awry due to reduced atmospheric pressure, or lack of oxygen.  For instance, a few cadets – probably smokers – suddenly conked off when oxygen levels were reduced to the equivalent of 25,000 ft in the pressure chamber.  This was in contrast to the majority who had enough warning signs like onset of confusion, shortness of breath, or blueing of nails.  The subject of ‘evolved’ gases needed no demonstration, mercifully, but the warning about not taking gas-producing foods or beverages before flying was well registered. The hazard of preoccupation during flying was also well understood when we all (except Imran Shirazi) failed to correctly count the blinks of a dot in the corner of the film frame, which had a racy dance number in progress.
        By the time we were midway in the third term, we had acquired basic knowledge of principles of flight, and were eager to touch the skies, as it were.  It was time to get introduced to practical flying, and there was no better way than to start on gliders. The Academy had two tandem seat Slingsby T-31 Tutors, besides two T-45 Swallow single-seaters.   Scheduling was done in batches, and we were to take turns during the evening sports periods.  On the first day, our excited batch was on the runway waiting for the instructor.  Looking at the T-31 glider was in itself awe-inspiring, and we were keen to see the instructor who could master this engineless contraption.  Soon, a handsome young man wearing flying coveralls and aircrew glasses arrived on a Vespa scooter, and introduced himself as Kamal.  With his fair complexion and blue eyes, he seemed like the archetype aviator of American movies.  Without his flying badge and ranks, there was an air of mystery about him, but word went around that he was a Mirage pilot, and would be checking our flying aptitude as prospective fighter pilots.  Kamal gave us a short talk and told us that 3-4 dual sorties had been planned per cadet, but depending on the performance, solos might be possible.  We were briefed about the pre-flight checks (CHISTR[1], that was it), and there was a demonstration of glider towing by the tow truck.  Kamal took us up one by one, the whole activity lasting a few weeks.  The promised solos were not flown, and it was only then that we realised the commitment was just to keep our enthusiasm from sagging.  It was only towards the end of the gliding phase when we learnt that Kamal was a Sergeant, though a most inspiring one at that. We always remembered him as the Mirage glider pilot.

Our third term ended when 58th GD (P) Course graduated on 25 October 1974. The parade was reviewed by the Turkish Air Force Commander, General Emin Alpkaya. After the graduation parade, we were glad to wear four stripes and formally step into the semi-final term, while cadets from 61st GD (P) Course arrived from Lower Topa to take our place in the third term.  We had started ground school at the PFT Wing for the upcoming flying training on Harvards, a few weeks before the graduation parade.
With the issue of flying clothing and accessories, our swagger knew no bounds.  Flying coveralls, flying gloves, flying shoes, flying helmet, oxygen mask, aircrew sunglasses, survival knife, air navigation computer, and Douglas protractor made up our flying kit. Some of the costlier luxury items like the aircrew watch, suitcase and flying jacket were to be issued after graduation, when we had completed our flying training successfully.  The much cherished flying badge was one item that we had to earn based on hard work – besides some luck – and was to be ‘issued’ on our graduation parade, someday.  For the time being the greatest privilege was to wear the flying coveralls when ‘cockpit time’ (familiarisation with the aircraft cockpit) started in the first week of November. 

We were assigned flying instructors, and I fell to the lot of Flt Lt Nusrat-ullah Khan who had perhaps chosen me for being a fellow Abdalian. My progress was surprisingly satisfactory, considering that the instructor was not known to suffer fools gladly.  After nine sorties, when I had started to consistently make three-pointer landings on the notoriously difficult tail-wheeler, we learnt that half the Harvard fleet had been grounded due to discovery of structural defects. The problem was promptly solved by inducting five of the recently purchased Swedish MFI-17 piston engine trainers in our No 1 PFT Squadron, while No 2 PFT Squadron was to continue flying the remaining Harvards that were free of defects.  For us it was a great relief, as the MFI-17 had a milder 200 hp engine compared to the Harvard’s beastly 600 hp one, and was also much easier to land with its tricycle landing gear that was not prone to a swing on landing.  The side-by-side seating was also conducive to learning, provided the instructor did not lose patience on every little mistake.  My instructor lost it once, not for my sub-standard flying performance, but for a bizarre reason that I was to blame. My flying glove carried a comical message, which had remained unobserved while we had been flying in the tandem seat Harvard.  Seeing it now over his shoulder, the instructor was riled by my chutzpah, and grounded me for a few days with threats of suspension. The matter was resolved when I was handed over to another instructor, Flt Lt Kamran Qureshi, who looked at the matter lightly, and saw me through the solo stage, right up to the Final Handling Test.
My first solo was eventful, but only so after landing. Having stopped the aircraft on the runway in a fairly short distance, I decided to use a kutcha taxiway link to turn off, instead of going till the end of the runway, as per SOPs.  It had rained a day or two earlier, and the ground was quite soggy. This, I discovered when the aircraft was not moving forward at idle power, and I had to rev up quite a bit.  There came a stage when the more power I added, more the wheels dug in. The only solution was to go up to full power, hop a few feet, and throttle back. Finally, with several hops, skips, and jumps, I made it to the concrete taxiway and back to the tarmac.  My instructor, Flt Lt Kamran, was standing at the parking spot; I was full of excitement, waiting to be doused by him with the traditional bucketful of water. As I came out of the aircraft, an angry-looking Flt Lt Kamran ordered me to collect all the fire buckets lying next to the parked aircraft. “Do you have an idea what have you done? Look at your mud-splattered aircraft.  Now wash it sparkling clean before you come back to the squadron,” he said, as he walked away. When I looked back, I was aghast at the condition of the aircraft; the instructor wasn’t angry without reason.  How silly of me! After about fifteen minutes of washing, Flt Lt Kamran called for me in the squadron.   With a wide grin on his face, he hugged me, and there was no mention of the incident.  His anger was always like a tempest in a teacup.  We remained great friends till he passed away in 1996.  

Talking of senior cadets being unable to handle authority judiciously, we were once again confronted with an unsavoury incident, soon after we had begun to fly. 59th GD (P) Course which was in the final term, ordered the usual punishment assembly for no reason but to assert its supremacy.  ‘Vicky,’ an otherwise unassuming and amiable senior, had apparently been pumped up by his course-mates to test his hitherto unused shouting abilities.  Fed up with the endless assemblies, our course decided not to turn up. Intervention of Cadets’ Wing officers was sought by the seniors, and another assembly was ordered.  It was made clear that absence would be tantamount to disobedience of lawful orders. The order was reluctantly registered, and all but three cadets turned up. The missing three had locked themselves in their rooms in the Olpherts[2] Lines, a detached block of buildings within the Cadets’ Mess.  The search party from amongst the seniors had to break open locks and bolts, and a brawl of sorts ensued.  The serious matter was reported to the authorities, and an inquiry followed.  It transpired that the three absentees were on last warning for having been involved in the earlier haircut revolt. Swift action followed, and they were withdrawn from the Academy.  A clear message was driven home that in the military, orders were to be obeyed first and questioned later.

Back in the PFT Wing, flying continued on a mixed note.  Those who got their solos would be doused with bucketfuls of water in the Cadets’ Mess lawns, a good-humoured tradition followed the world over.  Sadly, seven cadets who were found lacking in flying aptitude in the primary stage were suspended, and found themselves in the disappointing UD category. One exceptional case that had a short leg reach to the rudder pedals on the Harvard, and three others who were marginal cases in flying, were lucky to get a chance to fly the MFI-17, after relegation to the junior course.
        Inam-ullah Khan was the first in our course to have been cleared to go solo.  On the fateful day, Inam lined up, opened full power, and started rolling for take-off. After covering a few hundred feet, when he raised the tail of his Harvard to get the tail-wheel off the ground, the aircraft swung viciously through 180 degrees and started heading towards the mobile control.  Several officers including the air traffic controller, and the instructors, rushed out of the mobile and ran for their lives. Seeing the impending disaster, Inam immediately switched off the engine and hastily evacuated the aircraft. There was only minor damage to the aircraft, and Inam’s instructor, Flt Lt Naseem Gul, gave him another chance to complete his solo flight.  The familiar PAF maxim that anyone who had mastered the Harvard could handle any aircraft was rendered true, as Inam went on to have a very successful flying career in PAF.
        On one occasion, while practising touch-and-go landings with his instructor Flt Lt Ejaz Wyne, Rauf swung the Harvard, and went on to the kutcha. The instructor, suspecting that the propeller or the wings may have grazed the uneven ground, unwisely asked Rauf to unstrap and go around the aircraft to look for damage, while he held brakes from the rear cockpit.  Oblivious of the danger, Rauf went so close to the spinning propeller that he was about to be chopped up. No amount of shouting by the instructor could attract Rauf’s attention.  In desperation, Flt Lt Ejaz opened power, causing a startled Rauf to jump away to safety. After the incident, Rauf was relegated to the junior course, where he successfully completed his flying training on the MFI-17.
        Mistakes made by cadets were sometimes dealt with whimsically, as in the case of Khalid Ismail who, while on a consolidation mission after his first solo, asked permission on radio for a ‘closed circuit pattern.’  The tight pattern was prohibited for student pilots, but Flt Lt Ejaz Wyne, mobile officer of the day, absent-mindedly cleared him.  When Khalid went around after a touch-and-go landing, Flt Lt Ejaz realised what had happened.  Ejaz promptly called Khalid to land full-stop out of the next approach, and switch off the aircraft after clearing at the end of the runway.  Arriving on scene in a jeep, Ejaz gave Khalid a dressing down, and in a fit of anger, ordered the slightly-built Khalid to haul the 15-kg parachute on his head, and run 3-km back to the squadron. That was a rather harsh punishment for a slip-up that the mobile officer was equally culpable for!

After the solo stage, the next hurdle to be cleared was the Final Navigation Test (FNT).  During my FNT, the mission had gone well, and I had made good the first three destinations smack on time.  The picturesque Potohar Plateau, where primary flying students flew the navigation phase, was quite familiar as most of the landmarks had been keenly observed during flying.  Suddenly, I heard the instructor call out, “Okay, divert to Tret. Do you know where is it?”
“Yes sir, we used to pass by Tret while proceeding to Lower Topa,” I replied to the check instructor (also the Flight Commander of the squadron) who was taking my FNT on the MFI-17. 
The tricky part of the test was a ‘practice diversion’ to another destination, as might be required in case of bad weather.  The instructor would suddenly announce a new destination, and the heading, time and fuel consumed had to be calculated while flying the aircraft accurately.  Now Tret was well outside our flying training area, and had never been observed from the air, so I was rather apprehensive about the diversion.  It was more so because Tret was in the Murree Hills, and prominent landmarks were few and far between. I was hoping that the instructor would soon ask me to resume the originally planned route if he found the calculations satisfactory, and the diversion progressing nicely; this was not an uncommon practice to save time, if the destination was far away.  There was no indication that the diversion would be cut short, despite the mission having gone very well so far.  I was going to be grilled to the limits, it seemed.
Soon after crossing Rewat, the ground started to rise, and I wondered if the instructor might take over the controls.  Otherwise a staid officer, he was in a jolly mood that day, tapping his fingers on the dashboard as if in accompaniment to a song in his heart.  Just to be doubly sure that the instructor was not lost in some thoughts while the aircraft flew lower and lower, I hesitatingly asked him if I was to carry on flying.  “I shall let you know when I want to take over the controls. You are doing fine. Continue.”
While it was comforting to know that an instructor had confidence in a student who had never flown low and that too in the hills, I was quite confused about what was going on. “Give me your map and chinagraph pencil,” the instructor ordered.  He took my map and scribbled something, which I thought were some kind of remarks about my mission.
“Do you see that shining silver tin roof, next to the green ones? Go straight for that house.” “Yes sir,” I excitedly replied.  Getting closer, I figured out a large house nestled in a thickly forested area.  “Okay Kaiser, good mission. I have the controls.”
From five hundred feet above ground that we were at, the instructor dived down to the tree tops and threw the aircraft in a tight left-hand turn, kicking off the menacing stall warning horn. As my G-stressed vision started to clear up, I saw something that was absolutely surreal, and right out of a movie. A blonde, fair-looking girl clad in red, came running out of the house and started waving at the aircraft.  The instructor told me to open the little photography window on my side of the canopy.  Next, he handed me the folded map and asked me to toss it out exactly when ordered. After two-odd orbits in which he sized up the release conditions, the instructor asked me to be ready. “Okay, drop it NOW. Keep looking outside and tell me if it has been picked up.”
The ‘toss bombing’ resulted in a near-direct hit, falling within a circle of radius 10 feet from the intended target. Quite like an airborne range safety officer, I announced the score to a beaming instructor. Much to my relief, the instructor announced, “You can relax now.  I shall fly us back to Risalpur.”
Back in the squadron my course-mates were keen to find out how had the mission gone, especially the diversion, so they could prepare for their upcoming tests accordingly.  When I told them about the jaunt to Tret, they did not believe me. No amount of requests to stop fibbing could sway me, with the result that some of them got annoyed.  Word went around that I was not divulging the actual diversion destination, lest others might learn some tricks and get better scores in their test missions. As if flying low in Murree Hills with a 50-hour total experience did not sound preposterous enough, dropping messages to the instructor’s sweetheart during a navigation test mission was simply unbelievable.
Weeks went by, and we completed the primary flying training course in end April 1975. A traditional end-course tea party was hosted by the instructors and their wives in the Cadets’ Mess. As the cadets swarmed around their instructors, I spotted the Flight Commander, with a newly-wed blonde wife standing beside him. I knew it was the same lady who had picked up the map dropped from the aircraft, and decided to prove my story to my course-mates. Gathering a few of them, I nonchalantly walked up to the couple and we all paid our respects, eagerly waiting for the ice to be broken.  The Flight Commander immediately turned to his wife, and introduced me by saying, “He was the one.  Now you better return his map.  He will need it for his T-37 training.” My story had been ‘officially’ confirmed within earshot of my course-mates, and needless to say, I was quite happy at the outcome.

A few missions after the FNT, we had to go through the Final Handling Tests (FHT) that would conclude our Primary Flying Training.  In one such FHT, Shaharyar Shaukat was taken up by the Officer Commanding (OC) of the PFT Wing, Wg Cdr Mujtaba Qureshi, in a Harvard.  One of the important exercises was a Simulated Flame-Out in which the instructor would power back to idle, and induce a bit of drag by lowering the flaps to simulate engine failure.  The student was to quickly convert any extra speed in to height, start gliding, and look for some plain ground for an emergency landing.  The exercise would terminate after a successful pattern had been flown and a landing was assured.  Shaharyar looked around and luckily found a khaki patch of ground that seemed like a perfect landing strip.  Gliding smugly, Shaharyar set himself for the pattern, but as he came lower, he was horrified to see the strip transform into what was actually a vast graveyard.  “What was the big rush to get here?” asked the OC, in a rare display of wry humour.  Shaharyar had unwittingly put fear of God in the OC, who passed him without any fuss.
Soon after the FHTs were over, we moved across the tarmac to the Basic Flying Training (BFT) Wing, to start a more comprehensive phase of training on the T-37 jet trainer.  Ground school on the T-37 included classroom instruction, as well as time on the simulator, which kept us busy during the month of May.  Parade rehearsals had also started for the upcoming graduation of 59th GD (P) Course.  The searing heat on the parade ground had to be endured.  Replacement of tea with iced Rooh Afza during the 11 o’clock break could do nothing to prevent cases of cadets crashing down on the sizzling tarmac, during the parade rehearsals.

The graduation parade of 59th GD (P) Course was finally held on 31 May 1975. The parade was aptly reviewed by Chief of the Air Staff, Air Marshal Zulfiqar Ali Khan, who had been the Commandant of the Academy a year earlier.  For us, the biggest pleasure was entering the final term; we were the senior-most after all, and had a thick stripe on our epaulettes that could not be missed from afar.
The three senior-most appointments from our course went to Inamullah Ahsan (Wing Under Officer), Shahid Dad (Under Officer, No 1 Sqn) and Azamuddin Khan (Under Officer, No 2 Sqn).  The three were privileged to reside in the Under Officers’ Block, while the rest of the course moved into the Olpherts Lines, where some of the course-mates had already been staying since the fourth term.  Single rooms, two cadets to a toilet, and a little backyard with each duplex were the special features of this colonial relic that existed since the very founding of Risalpur Cantonment.
        At the BFT Wing, we were once again assigned instructors, and I was lucky to have been earmarked as the student of Flt Lt Peter Glover, an RAF exchange pilot.  For me it would be an especially rewarding experience, as Flt Lt Glover was an ‘A’ Category instructor from RAF’s renowned Central Flying School.  His superb instructional technique was evident when I and Shafiq Akbar (Flt Lt Glover’s other student), were the first ones to go solo on the T-37 after a little over seven hours of flying.  Consolidation and basic aerobatics followed before we proceeded for the summer vacations.  Unfortunately, five cadets were suspended in the early stages of BFT, bringing the total to twelve, including the previous PFT cases. 27% attrition on grounds of slow progress out of a total of 44 was high, but not surprising for those times, as flying aptitude tests had not yet been included in the selection process.

Before we could proceed on our summer vacations in July ‘75, we learnt that we had to undergo a one-week General Survival Course at PAF’s Ski and Survival School in Naltar, near Gilgit. This was one of several aircrew survival courses, including jungle, sea, desert and snow that we went on to attend in the first few years after graduation.  The idea was for aircrew to experience survival conditions in different environments, in case of ejection from an aircraft.
        We flew to Gilgit by C-130, but got a rude shock after disembarking when we were ordered to trek all the way to Nomal, 25 km away.  A night stay at a spartan rest house was followed, next morning, by a gruelling hike to Naltar 20 km away at an elevation of 10,000 ft.  The picturesque surroundings could be little appreciated as we huffed and puffed while traversing 4,000 ft up from Nomal to Naltar.
        After arrival in Naltar, we were briefed about a camp-out for two days and nights.  We had to sleep in improvised shelters made out of parachutes, and had to live off the land during this period.  The first day was spent hiking to the first of three azure and green Naltar Lakes, about 12 km way.  The freezing water of the lake was the just the right challenge for our survival instructor, Flt Lt Zafar Yusufzai, a tough commando, to take a dip. We goaded him, and he did not disappoint us amidst cheers.  We noted that goats and sheep were grazing on their own in the area, which gave us instant ideas about how to live off the land.
        As night fell, we got to work on improvising our shelters, while a hunting party set forth to find food.  Lo and behold, after a few hours, the hunters emerged with a goat slung around Ashiq’s shoulders. The goat was secretly slaughtered, skinned and chopped up for a barbecue by Shafiq who, we discovered, was not just a 'caterer,' but a master butcher too. A hurried barbecue followed, and the entrails and all traces of the animal were dumped in the nearby river.
        The next day was a rest and recreation break, and small groups loitered in the area.  The course was finally over after six days, and we returned to Gilgit, awaiting the C-130 to pick us up. Due to weather delays, we had to rough it out at the Army’s Casualty Clearance Section for two more days. Finally, when the C-130 came, we had to share space with casualties from an Army troop bus that had met a road accident near Gilgit.  Reaching Rawalpindi, we dispersed to our homes for vacations.

After return from the summer break, we resumed flying which included consolidation of circuit and landings, and aerobatics.  Instrument flying, never a favourite phase of aspiring fighter pilots, was made interesting by Flt Lt Glover as he, being a transport pilot, was well-versed in blind flying on instruments.  His instructional technique was excellent, and I obtained top marks in the Instrument Rating Test.  The next phase was formation flying, which was not quite Glover’s forte, and I had to fly with several instructors.  Amongst them, Flt Lt Iqbal Haider, a member of the ‘Sherdils’ aerobatics team, taught me precise formation flying, and his anticipation techniques – chippak jao, hilnay na do – still ring in my ears. The last few phases including navigation, advanced aerobatics, and night flying were handled by yet another instructor, Flt Lt Liaquat Hayat, for Glover’s tenure as an exchange pilot was over.  I had to adjust to these new instructors every once in a while, but luckily, I did not face any issues as we got along well in the cockpit.  At the end of October ’75, I went up for my FHT with the soft-spoken OC of BFT Wing, Wg Cdr Javed Afzaal.  A man of few words, he barely murmured, “Good, you are a qualified pilot now.”  I was over the moon!
For me, November was a fairly free month, and I spent a lot of spare time in the well-stocked library.  Half-hearted preparations for the final exams also started, but the focus remained on the graduation parade.  We ordered new ceremonial uniforms with the tailor.  Towards the end of the month, we were out on the parade square rehearsing the rifle drill movements, including saluting on the march, and presentation of arms, etc.  The parade consisted of two squadrons, each composed of three flights.  The squadrons were led by the Flight Cadet Under Officers and the flights by Flight Cadet Sergeants, all wielding ceremonial swords, scabbards, and gold-embroidered belts.  The rest of the cadets carried the G-3 rifles. The parade was initially supervised by the General Service Training Officer (GSTO), Sqn Ldr Bardar Khan, a gruff old man, who had always been rather stern on the parade square.  Luckily, a new GSTO, Sqn Ldr G I Khan took charge, and the drill movements came up to the desired standard in no time; this was largely due to his congenial manner of dealing with parade-weary cadets.  The full brass band, led by the veteran band master Warrant Officer Allah Ditta, used to play the very inspiring marching tune, Aye mard-e-mujahid jaag zara, ab waqt-e-shahadat hai aya.  It would sometimes get hilarious when somebody on parade would faint and crash on the tarmac, while the band played the stirring tune!  After parade, Ditta’s band would entertain us with music from popular songs.
Flying log book records were finalised and signed by the respective Squadron Commanders.   I had flown a total of 154:45 hours, during my flying training.  One day, we received certificates signed by the Commandant of the Academy (newly posted Air Cdre Sultan M Dutta), stating that we were ‘qualified to wear the Pakistan Air Force Flying Badge with effect from 20th Dec 1975.’  These certificates were duly pasted in the flying log books, but we still had to wait for the big day to actually flaunt the ‘wings’ on our uniforms.
The ground subjects final examinations took a few days, and a big burden was off our heads.  The results did not take long to be announced, and all those who sat for the exams qualified for the University degree.  It was a particularly gratifying achievement for those who had been dropped from flying earlier.

The graduation parade was scheduled for 20th December, 1975, and was to be reviewed by the Chief of Army Staff, General Tikka Khan, HJ.  The Chief of Air Staff, Air Marshal Zulfiqar Ali Khan was also to be in attendance. Parade had been rehearsed to perfection scores of times, as excitement for the grand event built up to a crescendo.  Invitations had gone out to parents and other guests, including officials of the diplomatic corps.
On the eve of the graduation, a dining-out night in mess kits was held in our honour, with speeches lauding our success at the end of our training.  Commendation certificates in various sports and extra-curricular activities were also awarded on the occasion by the Academy Commandant.
       On the big day, the parade formed up under command of the Wing Under Officer Inamullah Ahsan. The Under Officers and Sergeants led their respective Squadrons and Flights.  The parents and dignitaries were seated, and the chief guest arrived on the dot. After presentation of arms, inspection of the parade, and march past, a speech by the chief guest followed.  The long-awaited time for award of wings had finally come.  33 flight cadets of our course – including one from UAE, and three from Libya – fell out of their positions on parade, formed up into a small flight and marched closer to the dais.  The rest of the parade shuffled up to re-form in an orderly fashion, and went into ‘at ease’ position for the high point of the ceremony. The parents and relatives of graduating cadets waited in anticipation.
The chief guest, walked up to Wing Under Officer Inamullah Ahsan at one end of the flight, shook hands with him, and pinned the wings on his chest.  Next he did the same to me, and then moved on to the next one, Inamullah Khan.  General Tikka extended his hand, but Inam broke into a smile and reminded the General that his right hand was holding a rifle, and he could not shake hands. It so happened that Inamullah Ahsan and myself were wielding the appointment holders’ ceremonial swords, which were in their scabbards, and both hands were free.  The chief guest was thus able to shake our hands, but Inam Khan – and the rest – who were equipped with rifles, had to decline this impromptu courtesy. With the flying badges pinned on our uniforms, it was time for announcement of the much-awaited awards.

The coveted Sword of Honour went to Shahid Dad, who also won the Ground Subjects Trophy. Shahid, a heads-down cadet had excelled in many fields, and was also an accomplished speaker. The Best Pilot Trophy went to the soft-spoken Muzaffar Ali, who was considered a matchless pilot, besides being well-informed on a variety of subjects.
As the parade marched off, Flt Lt Hameed-ullah Khan, who was doing the commentary in his clipped British accent, called attention of the audience for a thrilling air show by ‘Sherdils,’ the academy aerobatics team.  Streaming coloured smoke, four T-37s approaching in line astern pulled up in front of the on-lookers, and slid into a perfect diamond formation.  Then followed a series of barrel rolls, loops, steep turns and wing overs, and the final ‘bomb burst’ in which the T-37s broke off like ‘splinters’ in all directions.  The audience was immensely awed by the performance.  The team was made up of flying instructors, and was led by Flt Lt Rizwan Qayyum, with other members being Flt Lts Iqbal Haider, Imtiaz Khan and Riffat Munir.  The aerobatics performance was a suitable finale to the graduation parade, and reflected the high standards at PAF Academy Risalpur.
After the parade, we took off our final term epaulettes, and replaced them with the Pilot Officers’ ranks that we had kept ready in our pockets.  Hugs and cheers followed, as our parents and relatives were delighted to see us, twenty-year old officers, strutting around proudly. Without much ado, we hurried to the Commandant’s residence where we had a group photograph with the chief guest, General Tikka Khan, along with the Chief of Air Staff and the Commandant. The photograph remains the most cherished memento of our course. 
Immediately after the group photograph, we were ushered into the auditorium where the convocation ceremony was held for the award of the Bachelor’s degrees from Peshawar University, with which the Academy was affiliated. That function marked the conclusion of an endeavour that had started nearly three years earlier.


EPILOGUE:  At Risalpur, we had been ragged to the bones; we were made to obey orders unflinchingly; we learnt that punctuality meant presence five minutes before time; we learnt table manners fit for royal banquets. Athletics, cross-country running, horse riding, rifle shooting, rowing, and swimming had transformed us into physically fit young men raring to go.  Incessant drills on the parade square had instilled in us pride in uniform, and a sense of ever-lasting camaraderie that exists in all fighting men.  It was at Risalpur that we had vowed to rise .… and then eventually, we touched the skies.

Note: The earlier period of training is covered in <Lower Topa Diaries>.


___________________
[1] CHISTR - Controls, Harness, Instruments, Spoilers, Trimmer, Release hook.
[2] Named after British General Sir William Olpherts, who was awarded the Victoria Cross for putting down the mutiny in Lucknow in 1857.

© KAISER TUFAIL


17 December 2019

Changing Dynamics of Air Warfare in South Asia

The Balakot strike by IAF on 26 February 2019, and PAF’s ‘Swift Retort’ a day later, can be considered watershed events in modern aerial warfare. Though the IAF strike was beset with technical snags, including failure of stand-off bombs to guide themselves to the target due to faulty terrain elevation data, it was able to deliver the ordnance – albeit, in the pine forests – from as far as 40 km away.  Interception of ingressing IAF fighters threw up a new conundrum:  flying in their own territory, the hostile intentions of the fighters could not be read in advance and they could not be fired at, lest Pakistan be accused of unprovoked aggression.  After weapons release, the IAF aircraft rapidly turned back, and could not be chased for fear of violating international rules of engagement, as the release of bombs – and the breach of peace – was discovered only after some time.

PAF retaliated within 30 hours of the IAF strike in broad daylight, and hit Indian military targets with stand-off bombs, staying well within own territory.  The sizeable strike package including its escorts, as well as the accompanying fighter sweep aircraft swamped the Indian air defence radar scopes, and the patrolling Su-30 aircraft were promptly vectored towards the PAF swarm.  Sooner the PAF strike fighters had delivered the bombs and turned around, the F-16s and JF-17s swept the skies, with very useful support from data-linked AEWC and ground radars, as well as from own formation members.  The pilots were glued to their multi-function displays streaming vital information and firing cues.  It was as if a whole squadron was playing a mass video game in the skies.  With excellent situational awareness, and the adversary in disarray, an F-16 fired a BVR AMRAAM (AIM-120C) at an approaching Su-30.  Whether the aircraft survived with nil or minor damage, or was hit critically remains moot, but the missile coming from nowhere and exploding in the vicinity resulted in complete panic amongst the IAF aircraft.  The patrolling IAF Mirage 2000s too seemed shell-shocked, and did not enter the fray; MiG-21 Bisons on ground alert had, therefore, to be scrambled. All this time PAF’s airborne and ground jammers were at work, and the IAF pilots and air defence controllers were thrown into total confusion. As one of the scrambled MiGs appeared on the radar scope of an F-16, another AMRAAM was fired, which shot the MiG out of the sky, the pilot surviving by a whisker and parachuting in to Pakistani territory.

The mission flown by the PAF was unique in many ways. The ground targets had been identified and prepared well in advance for exactly such an eventuality. The pilots had routinely practised flying in large packages, with ECM support and comprehensive situational awareness provided by AEWC aircraft. BVR missiles were used in the Indo-Pak scenario for the first time;  interestingly, close combat situations did not crop up for the classic dogfighters like PAF’s F-16 and IAF’s Mirage 2000, for instance.  It was manifest that BVR combat had taken precedence over close combat, if not rendering it completely obsolete.  A fighter in any future conflict must, therefore, have both long and short range missile firing capabilities, along with the associated sensors like radars, threat warning systems, and data links.  PAF could do well by urgently replacing its legacy fighters with ‘home-grown’ JF-17s (especially the upcoming Block III version), which have all the desirable attributes at an affordable cost.

For surface attack, stand-off capabilities were demonstrated by both air forces, and the safety of attacking aircraft was clearly highlighted. Accuracy of the attacks was, however, not achieved for different reasons:  the IAF suffering from faulty terrain data being fed into the bombs’ guidance system, and PAF being constrained by political considerations to prevent escalation by avoiding direct hits on military targets. In any case, the efficacy of stand-off weapon delivery was unmistakably validated, and it is certain that this is likely to be the mode of choice in any future conflict. An aircraft not having such a weapon delivery capability should be considered redundant for surface attack missions.

With IAF having the initiative, and PAF finding itself in a reactive mode, the latter’s full operational preparedness clearly saved the day. The whole operation was over within 48 hours, and deployment of strike elements of ground forces did not take place.  It became amply clear that air forces offer the best and swiftest means of retribution under a nuclear overhang, as the relatively slow positioning of ground troops to their operational areas is fraught with the possibility of being stymied, due to international pressure.  PAF’s tour de force will, thus, serve as a model for dealing with any future Indian military action that is punitive in nature.  PAF’s preparedness must continue to be refined, as IAF is expected to iron out the hitches that dogged its operations during the failed Balakot strike.

It is to be noted that after a disastrous showing by IAF on the 26th and 27th February, the Indian government unwisely decided to even the score by deploying – conceivably, for employing – Surface-to-Surface Missiles (SSMs) against targets in Pakistan.  Apparently, this measure was aimed at preventing further fighter losses at the hands of the PAF that was perceived by the IAF as being technically superior.  Exercise of the rash and senseless decision to deploy SSMs could well have been misconstrued by Pakistan, and a catastrophic exchange could have followed between nuclear-armed neighbours.  The Government of Pakistan, as well as its armed forces, should treat it as a textbook lesson in regional conflict escalation dynamics, and must remain cognisant of such developments in any future conflict.

With the Rubicon having been crossed after the Balakot raid, use of IAF fighters to compliment the usual artillery shelling across the Line of Control, is likely to be the new norm for intimidating Pakistan.  While PAF’s response is likely to be as swift as it was on 27 February, decision-making by the politico-military leadership may be complicated by a host of prevailing factors, both internal and external.  It is therefore imperative that meetings of the National Security Council and Joint Staff Headquarters are conducted regularly, and key decision-makers are kept posted about the developments so that there are no surprises.  The government must be fully aware that for the PAF to react as swiftly as it did in the recent skirmish, there will be a premium on prompt and smart decision-making.  It is also important to note that what starts as a single service response (by the PAF), could rapidly morph into a wider war; as such, over-dependence on the PAF could be fraught with risks, and a joint services response must continue to remain the ultimate objective of the Pakistani government to any aggression.

© KAISER TUFAIL

This article was published in Pakistan Politico, December 2019 Special Issue and in Defence Journal, January 2020 issue.

01 June 2019

Pulwama - From Bluster to a Whimper

Immediately after the Pulwama suicide attack on 14 February 2019, in which a young Kashmiri lad blew himself up killing 40 Indian para-military troops, a cacophony of accusations were hurled against Pakistan. In a purported phone call, the caller claiming to be a representative of the Jaish-e-Muhammad (JeM) – an internationally proscribed terrorist organisation – was said to have owned up the bombing.  Calls for revenge grew by the hour, and it was not long before the Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi allegedly discovered incriminating links and vowed to teach Pakistan a lesson.  It seemed that Modi saw punitive action against Pakistan as a key to a landslide victory in the upcoming elections and was, thus, completely blinded to the dangers of escalation of hostilities between the two nuclear-armed neighbours.  In all likelihood, Modi also believed – or was made to believe – that Pakistan did not have the gumption to take on the might and stamina of the Indian military, seemingly buttressed by its madcap media and the rightist supporters.
The Indian repression in Kashmir has seen no let up for over seven decades, with the last ten years having been particularly bloody. Thousands of killings, mass arrests, rapes, kidnappings, use of pellet guns to blind and maim protesters, and gross human rights violations have been the Indian government’s despicable methods to respond to the Kashmiris’ right of self-determination. That the right has been enshrined in numerous UN resolutions cuts no ice with an intransigent India.  It was in the backdrop of these circumstances that 20-year old Adil Ahmed Dar, who had been humiliated, tortured and illegally detained, decided to take law into his own hands and square off with the so-called law enforcers.  Driving a car packed with about 80-100 kilos of explosives, Dar rammed a bus laden with policemen of the Central Reserve Police Force, killing 40 of them.  A phone call was opportunely received by Indian intelligence agencies soon after, claiming that JeM had carried out the bombing. The Indian media stirred up a storm in no time, and every Indian bayed for Pakistani blood.  Hints of an imminent ‘surgical strike,’ by India – fake and farcical though the previous one in 2016 had been – began to make the rounds. The die had been cast, and there was no going back. India failed to provide evidence of Dar’s contacts with anyone in Pakistan, either by way of tapped phone calls, physical contact with any Pakistani agents, or material found on his person or from his home indicating any complicity. All that was known about Dar was that he was a home-grown Kashmiri youngster with no outside contacts whatsoever, and that he had been radicalised by the spate of brutalities by the Indian law enforcing agencies.  Acting as the judge, jury and executioner, and pandering to the frenzy created by the irresponsible media, Modi declared that Dar had been trained and supported by Pakistani agents.  Retribution was, thus, the only option to deter any more ‘mischief’ by Pakistan, Modi blustered. It was made clear that India would decide the time and place to administer exemplary punishment to Pakistan.
At 0130 hours (all times PST), on the morning of 26 February, a flight of sixteen IAF Mirage 2000 took off from their home base, Gwalior.  The strike element in the formation included six Mirage 2000H armed with one 900 kg Israeli-origin Spice 2000 bomb each, and four Mirage 2000H (out of the originally planned six) armed with one Israeli-origin Crystal Maze [1] missile each. Six upgraded Mirage 2000I, each armed with six MICA air-to-air missiles, escorted the strike package. The Mirage 2000s, which had to traverse a distance of 1,000 km from Gwalior, were supported midway by an Il-78 in-flight refuelling tanker.  One Airborne Early Warning and Control System (AEWCS) aircraft provided surveillance support to the strike package.

While the Spice 2000 bombs could be launched in the autonomous GPS-assisted delivery mode, the Crystal Maze missiles had to be steered to the target by the pilot via data link, after launch. The TV/imaging infra-red camera in the nose of the Crystal Maze missile could not only provide a view to the pilot for steering it to the target, the dramatic terminal phase could be fed as live video to the revenge-hungry Indian public. 

The first of several snags hit the mission when cloud cover over all of Kashmir precluded employment of the Crystal Maze missiles, and the four Mirage 2000H had to hold off in frustration. The remaining formation sneaked in from a south-easterly direction for a stand-off attack on a seminary at Jabba village near Balakot town, close to the Line of Control (de facto border).  At 0258 hours, six Mirages carrying the Spice 2000 bombs lobbed them, and broke off immediately.  With the bombs’ stand-off range of over 60 km, there was no need to cross into Pakistani territory, as safety of their aircraft was of greater concern, than any qualms about international censure for violating Pakistan’s airspace. In  the event, the aircraft did ingress about 10 km into Azad Kashmir, ostensibly to drive home a point that India did not consider it as disputed territory.  Traversing about 40 km, five bombs fell in a forested area, a few hundred meters from the intended target, and decimated nothing more than a few pine trees.[2]  F-16 and JF-17 fighters on patrol were promptly directed to intercept the intruders, but were restrained by the prevalent rules of engagement from crossing over into enemy territory.  

It was propitious that the bombs did not hit the seminary, as it housed a boarding facility for over 200 students aged 8-15 years. The seminary is one of thousands of similar facilities in the country where young children memorise the Holy Quran, a not uncommon practice amongst the faithful. Mercifully, there was no loss of lives or property at Balakot as the IAF mission had failed completely.  
There have been speculations about the cause of the failure, but the most plausible one was proffered by three members of the Australian Strategic Policy Institute (ASPI) viz, Marcus Hellyer, Nathan Ruser and Aakriti Bachhawat. The trio posited that there was a mismatch between the target elevation sensed by the GPS and the orthometric elevation (above mean sea level) as given on aeronautical charts. Apparently the orthometric elevation was in error (less than actual), causing all the bombs to overshoot. PAF’s former Gp Capt Parvez Mahmood, who has extensive experience of interpreting satellite imagery, is of the opinion that, “determining a precise 3D point on Earth requires satisfying a lot of variables, so errors similar to the one in the Balakot strike are not unusual.”

High resolution satellite images of the bomb impact craters provided by European Space Imaging (ESI) clearly show that all the bombs missed their targets by similar distances, and in the same direction, indicating a mission planning miscalculation. According to Adrian Zevenbergen, the Managing Director of ESI, which released an image of the so-called Jaish camp a day after the IAF's attack, “The image captured with Worldview-2 of the buildings in question shows no evidence of a bombing having occurred. There are no signs of scorching, no large distinguishable holes in the roofs of buildings and no signs of stress to the surrounding vegetation.”

Immediately after the failed Indian strike, Pakistanis clamoured for revenge as expected, and Prime Minister Imran Khan duly promised it. The dilemma of escalation weighed heavily on the political and military leadership, and there was consensus that the response had to be as measured and controlled as was possible. Even the number of bombs planned for delivery were to be in equal measure.  The PAF was well-prepared for a whole range of targeting options, and it settled for a stand-off attack similar to the IAF’s, with the important difference that it would be against military targets in the Poonch-Rajauri-Naushera Sector in Indian Held Kashmir (IHK).
The IAF stood guard on the night of 26 February when the PAF’s riposte was expected. Extensive Combat Air Patrols (CAP) were flown by the IAF, with surveillance support from ground radars, as well as an AEWCS aircraft anchored over Adampur.   When the PAF did not show up till sunrise of 27 February, the IAF eased off from its highest alert state, and waited for the following night. A pair of Su-30MKI was patrolling near Srinagar, while a pair of Mirage 2000I was patrolling east of Udhampur.   PAF’s deception worked splendidly when its strike package of four Mirage 5PA/IIIDA of  No 15 Squadron and two JF-17 of No 16 Squadron, duly supported by a big swarm of escorts and patrolling fighters (a mix of F-16A/B and JF-17), cluttered the scopes of IAF’s ground radars at 0920 hours.[3] Working at the rear of the fighter package were PAF’s SAAB Erieye AEWCS aircraft, and the DA-20 Falcon in which electronic warfare wizards sat ready with their arcane tricks.
Two vintage – but still quite capable – Mirage 5PA, each armed with one H-4 stand-off  bomb[4], along with two JF-17, each armed with two Mk-83 Range Extension Kit (REK) bombs[5], headed towards their respective targets in southern-western IHK.  It was a bright and clear morning, with excellent visibility after the previous night’s rain. Each Mirage 5PA was followed by its communication control aircraft, a dual-seat Mirage IIIDA, which was to steer the H-4 after launch through data link, while the JF-17s’ Mk-83 REK were to be launched in the autonomous ‘fire and forget’ mode. With the H-4 having a range of over 120 km, and the Mk-83 REK having at least half of that, the bombs offered safety to the launch aircraft as these could be delivered from well inside own territory, and the aircraft could then break off.  The Mirage IIIDA control aircraft, however, had to continue flying towards the target, refining the H-4 bomb’s flight path till impact. The bomb can be steered with great accuracy, as the high resolution image of the target seen by the bomb’s seeker head is constantly relayed to the control aircraft. Since the purpose of the mission was essentially to demonstrate that Pakistan had the resolve, as well as the capability of responding in kind, it was decided that there was no compelling need to pick the front door of a brigade commander’s office, or the air shafts of soldiers’ bunkers. General area bombing of open spaces in military garrisons near the Line of Control (LOC) in IHK was, therefore, agreed upon.[6]  It was expected that this ‘abundance of restraint’ would prevent mass carnage in the Indian military garrisons, which could otherwise lead to a chain of escalatory actions, and spiral into a very dangerous all-out war under a nuclear overhang.  
When the PAF struck the garrisons within 32 hours of IAF’s abortive air strike at Balakot, it came like a ‘shot across the bow’ and had the desired sobering effect on the Indian military commanders.[7]   General Bipin Rawat, the Indian Chief of Army Staff, was forced to take a pause from his regular harangue about sorting out Pakistan. Unsurprisingly, he has not uttered any more threats to Pakistan, ever since.
Sqn Ldr Hasan Siddiqui
PAF’s approaching strike force had, meanwhile, rung frantic alarms on the Indian air defence radars, and patrolling fighters were directed to intercept them.  Struggling to sift through the degraded communications environment, IAF fighters were unable to understand the instructions of their air defence controllers.  An F-16 pair led by Sqn Ldr Hasan Siddiqui of the elite Combat Commanders’ School, was vectored towards two approaching IAF fighters flying in an extended trail formation. The very long range at which the adversary aircraft appeared on the F-16 radar scopes suggested that these were big targets, most likely Su-30MKI. After sampling the target data and confirming valid firing parameters, Hasan let go an AIM-120C (AMRAAM)[8] at 0936 hours, and promptly announced ‘Fox Three,’ the brevity code for an active radar-guided missile launch.  Missile flight data fed back to the F-16 fire control computer in real-time, seemed to indicate that the missile had made its mark.   Whether the Su-30 had met a violent end, or was damaged and landed back, or the aircrew had been able to kinetically defeat the missile altogether, remains moot.  Hard evidence by way of aircraft wreckage or details of aircrew casualties has not been available so far. Debris of the AIM-120C missile was, however, picked up and displayed on Indian television in a ludicrous tri-services press conference, as the IAF brass unsportingly complained about PAF using F-16s in what was actually a telling response to its own aggression.
Soon after the shoot-out, all hell broke loose in the Indian camp, as revealed by radar and VHF radio monitoring.  In the ensuing confusion, the Terminal Air Defence Unit at Srinagar Air Force Station reported a slow speed radar contact heading towards it. As leaked reports suggest, the contact was taken for a hostile Unmanned Aerial Vehicle, and the Chief Operations Officer ordered it to be shot down. At 0940 hours, an Israeli-origin Spyder surface-to-air missile was launched, but its target turned out to be an IAF Mi-17 V-5 helicopter belonging to the Srinagar-based No 154 Helicopter Unit. The helicopter crashed near Budgam, and six aircrew, along with a civilian on the ground, lost their lives in a case of morale-shattering fratricide.
Meanwhile, higher in the skies, the sole Su-30 remaining in the area flew helter-skelter, something quite baffling, considering that these are multi-crew fighters endowed with very powerful radars, and were armed to the teeth with an array of four R-77 active radar-guided BVR missiles, and four R-73 infra-red seeking dogfight missiles each.  The Su-30 abruptly called ‘Bingo’ (low on fuel) and exited the area at high speed after only 25 minutes of flight, despite having an endurance of at least two hours while on routine air patrols. As per radio monitoring, it transpired that the two Su-30s had earlier failed to synchronise their data links and had been unable to provide any mutual support by way of radar data sharing.
In the on-going fracas, the Mirage 2000 formation on patrol was pulled back. In all probability, this was done to prevent these high value aircraft from being targeted by more BVR shots; however, one is also inclined to believe that the panic-striken pilots may have opportunely declared some kind of weapon system failures. Whatever the reason, these state-of-the-art Mirages were of no help in warding off the PAF fighters, despite being equipped with MICA missiles that were comparable in performance to the F-16s’ AMRAAMs.  As for operational commanders on the ground, it needs no guessing that they had gone into a paralytic freeze, and needed time to gather their wits. When the decision for action finally came, it was a pathetic one: to use the MiG-21 Bisons  virtually as cannon fodder, it may be added.
Wg Cdr Noman Ali Khan
At 0930 hours, two pairs of MiG-21 Bisons of No 51 Squadron were scrambled successively from Srinagar and nearby Awantipur, to boost up IAF’s diminishing presence in the air. A senior pilot, Wg Cdr Abhinandan ‘Nandu’ Varthaman (callsign ‘Alpha One’), along with his wingman, Sqn Ldr Anubhav Vyas, was directed by the ground radar to “turn 160 (degrees),” towards a patrolling pair of PAF fighters.  Flying low and masked by the Parmandal Range, Abhinandan had tried to pull a surprise by abruptly popping up from behind the hills.  Apprehending PAF's snooping capabilities, he had even switched off his Identification Friend or Foe (IFF) transponder. He also kept his radar controller posted about his ground position by reporting it in pre-arranged codes. However, Abhinandan remained oblivious of the fact that unlike ground based radars, PAF's AEWCs and high flying fighters had no line of sight issues, and could clearly see him on their radars. Moments after he called out his ground position, "over LC (Line of Control)," Abhinandan’s MiG-21 was hit by an AIM-120C missile launched from an F-16 flown by Wg Cdr Noman Ali Khan, the Officer Commanding of No 29 ‘Aggressor’ Squadron, and also the overall mission leader. Radio monitoring revealed that Abhinandan  was being frantically warned by his ground control about the danger he was getting into. “Alpha One, flow cold. Nandu, if you hear me, flow cold,” is how a desperate female controller, Flt Lt Minty Agarwal, called the unresponsive pilot in high-pitched screams.[9]  Fully conscious but half-deaf by then, Abhinandan soon ran into troublethough Vyas, having heard the warning screams, was able to make good his escape.

At around 0957 hours, he was seen to be coming down by parachute near Sandar village in Bhimber District, about five km from the LOC inside Azad Kashmir.  Not unexpectedly, he got an unsavoury welcome at the hands of locals who had mobbed him. Later, during his brief confinement, Abhinandan stated that while he was looking for the target on the MiG-21 radar display, his aircraft was hit, and he managed to eject just as it went out of control.[10]  

It has to be noted that at no stage did Abhinandan claim shooting down an F-16, something deceitfully attributed to him after his repatriation by none other than the Indian Defence Minister, Nirmala Sitharaman. The false claim has been repeated ad nauseam by the IAF, and parroted by the Indian media in a furtive effort to redeem some respectability, after a disastrous showing by the world’s fourth largest air force.  All four of the unfired missiles were recovered from the MiG-21 wreckage, and displayed to the media by the Pakistan’s Inter Services Public Relations, exposing Sitharaman’s brazen claim.[11]
"The tea was fantastic!"
Abhinandan’s effusive compliments to the Pakistan Army about being ‘a very professional service’ – as well as praise for the delicious tea served to him at a custodial facility, which he slurped with relish – earned him enough ‘brownie’ points in Pakistan. His countrymen, however, were evidently not amused by his capers. Abhinandan was discourteously seen off by the Islamabad-based Indian Air Advisor at the border crossing point of Wagah, and in a frosty reception, was not even saluted by the Indian guards as he set foot in his country. It is not too far-fetched to imagine that on return from captivity, Abhinandan was presented with a fait accompli: claim downing an F-16, or face disciplinary action for ‘unpatriotically fraternising with the enemy.’  If such was indeed the case, it is possible that a straight-talking Abhinandan may be averse to towing the official line, and explains why the ‘hero’ continues to be hidden from the media and the public on grounds of ‘security.’
According to a report by senior staff writer Lara Seligman of the prominent US Foreign  Policy magazine (4 April 2019), “a US count of the F-16s with Pakistan found that all the fighter planes were present and accounted for, and none of them were missing.”  The report clearly contradicts India’s claim that the IAF had shot down a PAF F-16. Seligman writes that, “the count, conducted by U.S. authorities on the ground in Pakistan, sheds doubt on New Delhi’s version of events, suggesting that Indian authorities may have misled the international community about what happened that day.”  In the same report, Vipin Narang, an Indian-origin US associate professor of political science at Massachusetts Institute of Technology, and a member of the MIT Security Studies Program states, “As details come out, it looks worse and worse for the Indians.  It looks increasingly like India failed to impose significant costs on Pakistan, but lost a plane and a helicopter of its own in the process.”
That the US has completely disregarded the frivolous Indian complaints also reinforces the Pakistani contention that the F-16s were used legitimately for self-defence.  Soon after the Indian protest, the US State Department’s deputy spokesman Robert Palladino shrugged it off by curtly stating that, “as a matter of policy, we don’t publicly comment on the contents of bilateral agreements involving US defence technologies.” Later on 28 April, The Indian Express quoted a US official as saying, “Soon after we were informed by the Indian side about Pakistan using F-16 aircraft on February 27, we informed the Indians that we will not be sharing any information on the subject as it is a bilateral matter between US and Pakistan.” The apparent US indifference to the Indian complaint can also be seen as a clever marketing ploy for US military hardware, which had yet again demonstrated its cutting edge.
Rather than complain about PAF using F-16s in combat, the IAF needs some stern introspection about its questionable performance.  Having the initiative, as well as some of the world’s best fighters like the Su-30MKI and Mirage 2000I in its inventory, it failed to deliver in a situation where it could have done what the plucky PAF actually did. The fig leaf of ‘technical asymmetry’ is now being shoddily used to cover up IAF’s embarrassing dysfunction at the operational and tactical levels.  What the IAF needs to reflect on is the hard fact the PAF is well-led, well-trained, very vigilant, and endowed with a strong fighting spirit.  It should not be difficult to see why it has consistently achieved outsized effects through narrowly focused efforts.
With zilch to show for, the proper course of action for Air Chief Marshal Birender Singh Dhanoa, the IAF air chief, would have been to step down.  Instead, he deplorably leagued up with the discomfited Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) government and the Bollywood-inured media, which continue to churn out nothing but lies and fanciful claims.  
It is of great concern that Modi’s military advisors, particularly the Air Staff, were unmindful of the fact that grave risk of escalation is inherent in the cavalier use of air power, whose most significant attribute is its vast offensive capability.  In the aerial encounter of 27 February, there was a high probability of several more IAF aircraft being shot down, given PAF’s definite edge in BVR air combat. The conflict was, thus, clearly fraught with the likelihood of tit-for-tat intensification to a point of no return.  That the two nuclear powers were on the brink of a terrible catastrophe is something which needs serious reflection, especially for the initiator of the conflict – in this case Mr Modi, who seemed to have coolly run an election campaign on the wings of the IAF.  According to Hannah Haegeland, a research fellow at The Stimson Center, “the perception of Indian military superiority has been tarnished. Its competence and professionalism is being questioned, because the military leaders knowingly defended an inaccurate BJP position.”
The Indian Prime Minister’s whimper (quoted in India Today, 3 March 2019) that, “if we had the Rafale, things would have been different,” begs a question: “Why did you step in the ring if you weren’t prepared, Modi jee?” Clearly, the Indian Prime Minister miscalculated Pakistan’s resolve and ability to pay back promptly, and ended up getting a black eye in the bargain.  To redeem the lost prestige of the military, it is entirely possible that a false flag operation may yet be contrived by Modi – a dangerous prospect that the world needs to be watchful about.

Note: Article revised on 2 March, 2020.
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[1] Crystal Maze is a derivative of the Israeli Popeye missile. It weighs 1,100 kg (2,400 lb), and has a range of 80 km.
[2] The sixth bomb is said to have failed to release.
[3] Two pairs of fighters escorted the strike packages, while four sections of 4-ship fighters each, patrolled along the LOC. The F-16s were armed with 4xAIM-120C-5 and 2xAIM-9M missiles, while the JF-17s were armed with 2xSD-10 and 2xPL-5 missiles.
[4] The H-4 stand-off weapon consists of a 2,600 lb (1,180 kg) bomb integrated with an automatically deployable wing unit, an electro-optical guidance unit, and control fins.
[5] The Mk-83 REK consists of a 1,000 lb (450 kg) bomb integrated with an automatically deployable wing unit, an inertial guidance unit aided by GPS, and control fins.
[6
] Targeting was planned in proximity of HQ 10 Brigade in Poonch and HQ 120 Brigade in Rajauri with 2xMk 83 REK bombs each, and in proximity of logistics and ammunition depots in Narian and Naushera with 1xH-4 bomb each.
[7
] In naval parlance, ‘a shot across the bow’ signifies a warning shot to a ship. It has been learnt that the GOC-in-C Northern Command, Lt Gen Ranbir Singh and Commander 16 Corps, Lt Gen Paramjit Singh had left after a meeting at Rajauri Brigade HQ only minutes before the bombing.
[8
] AMRAAM stands for Advanced Medium Range Air-to-Air Missile.
[9] 'Flow cold' means avoiding a head-on, high rate-of-closure approach. By turning away, the missile’s firing envelope can be drastically shrunk, and the missile can be defeated kinetically.
[10
] The downed MiG-21 tail number was CU2328. It was configured with four missiles under the wings, and an under-fuselage drop tank.
[11
] Clearly recognisable despite the considerable crash damage, these missiles included 2xR-73 dogfight missiles, and 2xR-77 BVR missiles.


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Frequently Asked Questions

Q 1.    What was the confusion about the number of downed IAF pilots on the day of the shooting?

A1.     The soldiers of two co-located Pak Army Units near the place of the IAF pilot’s parachute landing, rushed to apprehend him. After his arrest, both Units reported to their higher formations that a pilot had been captured. The higher formations in turn reported the same to GHQ, which understood the two reports to be independent, and hastily announced the capture of two pilots. The report was later retracted, but in the interim a lot of confusion prevailed.

Q2.     The Indians claim that the missing rocket motor in the debris of one of the MiG-21 R-73 missiles (extreme right in picture) indicates that it may have been fired at the PAF F-16. The Indians claim that the missile’s Guidance and Control Unit was later retrieved from the ground by Pak Army, and then displayed with the rest of the missiles to give the impression that it was actually found in the MiG-21 wreckage. What do you have to say?

A2.     A keen observer of the MiG-21 wreckage would note that the rocket motor of the missile in question (rectangle 2) is stuck on the missile launcher rail, as it did not get dislodged on impact with the ground. As such, all the missile parts could not be put together and displayed.  The pictures below make it quite clear that all parts of the missile were available in the wreckage.

[Courtesy Michael Sheldon and Kanish Karan of DFRLab]

Q3.     What were the Indian senior officers trying to prove by displaying a part of the AIM-120C during a press conference?

A3.     The Indian senior officers were trying to bring it to the notice of Americans that PAF had employed the F-16s and AIM-120C missiles in contravention of the purchase agreement with them. The Indians were apparently under the impression that these missiles had been purchased at over $500,000 a piece only to shoot down non-existent Taliban  fighter aircraft, and that their use against India was not fair play.

Q4.    Why do you think the Su-30MKI, with its powerful long range radar and R-77 BVR missiles, was unable to shoot down any PAF fighter?

A4.    While the Su-30MKI's radar (N011M 'Bars') is indeed powerful and has very long search and track ranges, the R-77 missile is clearly outranged by the F-16's AIM-120C-5 AMRAAM. So there is a radar-weapon mismatch on the Su-30MKI, which is why the IAF is desperate to get the Meteor missile-equipped Rafale fighters.


Q5.    Why haven’t you disclosed the maximum range of the AIM-120C, as well as the ranges at which these missiles were fired? That would have made reconstruction of the air combat a lot more easier to understand.

A5.     A frank answer is that I do not want to go to jail!  


Q6.    It was disclosed during the Inter Services Public Relations (ISPR) press conference that F-16s were not employed in the conflict. What do you have to say about that?

A6.     Please refer to Q/A7.


Q7.    Since air combat is a highly technical subject, wouldn't it have been better to have a PAF fighter pilot alongside, during the ISPR press conferences pertaining to the conflict?

A7.     I couldn't agree more on this point. I am reminded of the old adage, 'Fighter Pilots do it Better.'

Q8.   What about the rumour that the IAF had planned to attack with surface-to-surface missiles (SSM) in reply to PAF's 'Swift Retort' on the morning of 27 Feb?

A8.   After a disastrous showing by IAF on the 26th and 27th February, the Indian government unwisely decided to even the score by deploying - conceivably for employing - SSMs against Pakistan.  Apparently, this measure was aimed at preventing further fighter losses at the hands of the PAF that was perceived by the IAF as 'technically superior.'  Exercise of the rash and senseless decision to deploy SSMs could well have been misconstrued by Pakistan, and a catastrophic exchange could have followed between nuclear-armed neighbours. It was fortuitous for USA to have gotten wind of the Indian move, and Modi was promptly ordered to hold fire, or else.


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© KAISER TUFAIL

This article was published in 'Defence Journal' July 2019 issue.