A Reactionary
Six-Point Programme
The Awami League’s
Six Point election manifesto was obsessively fixated with devolution of powers
from the federation to the provinces, to an unprecedented extent. The federal
subjects included only foreign affairs and defence. Two mutually convertible currencies,
or as an alternative, a single currency subject to establishment of separate regional
Federal Reserve Banks for the two wings of the country were proposed to be
established, ‘to prevent transfer of resources and flight of capital from one
region to the other.’ Fiscal policy was to be the responsibility of the
federating units, which would provide the requisite revenue resources to the
federal government according to a laid down formula. More seditious was the
proviso for separate accounts of foreign exchange earnings of each of the
federating units, which were to be maintained under control of their respective
governments. This stipulation entailed sanctioning the federating units to
independently negotiate foreign trade and assistance with other countries.
Finally, the government of each of the federating units was to be empowered to
maintain a militia or para-military force for ‘effective contribution towards
national security.’
A
latent problem of the Six-Point Programme was that it had unintended
consequences for the federating units in the western wing.[1]
It implied, for instance that all four
federating units (provinces) in the western wing along with the eastern wing
could chart out their own fiscal policy, and could conduct foreign trade and
negotiate financial assistance from international donors. There was also the
ripe possibility of each of the federating units of the western wing demanding its
own Federal Reserve Bank, which would have virtually amounted to independence.
A
cursory glance at the Six-Point Programme indicates that the cause of
disagreement was essentially the purported flight of capital from East Pakistan
to West Pakistan. Most of the points
revolved around safeguarding East Pakistan’s share of export revenues. It was
also clear that a maximalist position had been adopted by the Awami League,
which stemmed from absolute confidence that it had the support of the masses,
and could carry the programme through without any hitch. Relenting on the
extreme position was foreseen only if the showing at elections was not as
expected, and some compromises had to be made.
Mired
in multiple problems and responsibilities, President Yahya paid little heed to
the consequences of the Six-Point Programme on Pakistan’s unity. On the face of it, the Legal Framework Order[2]
(LFO) that circumscribed the 1970 elections process accepted the Six-Point Programme
as reasonable and legitimate. On the
other hand, it was the LFO, which irked Mujib sorely, particularly a clause that
vested powers of authentication of the future Constitution with the President. It implied that Mujib would not have a free
hand to implement his Six-Point Programme, even if he obtained a majority in
the National Assembly. Apparently, Yahya
felt self-assured because he could exercise his powers to veto the Constitution
Bill if the need arose. In any case,
Yahya trusted his intelligence agencies’ prognosis of a split verdict, and thought
that the stage of a veto may not be reached. In case of a split electoral verdict, Yahya
was sure that the points of conflict in Awami League’s radical programme could
be resolved through coercive diplomacy when the time came for transfer of power.
If Yahya had foreseen that Awami League
could sweep the elections, his plan of action for transfer of power would
certainly have been less cavalier. Blaming the Six-Point Programme as subversive
after having accepted it as a bonafide election manifesto just did not make
sense. Disapproving a Constitution Bill passed by the elected representatives
on grounds that its Six Points were violative of national integrity was a poor
back-up plan, and an extremely provocative one at that. Mujib is claimed to have confided to his
senior colleagues, “My aim is to establish Bangla Desh.[3]
I shall tear LFO into pieces as soon as the elections are over. Who could
challenge me once the elections are over.”[4]
Elections and the
Ensuing Impasse
Elections to the
National Assembly were held on 7 December 1970, and to the Provincial
Assemblies ten days later. Overall voter
turnout was fairly high, with 58% of the registered voters casting their votes
in the National Assembly elections. The turnout was considerably higher in the
West Pakistani provinces – 65%, compared to East Pakistan with 55%.
Of
the 300 seats contested in the National Assembly, Sheikh Mujib-ur-Rahman’s
Awami League won 160 (all in East Pakistan), while Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto’s
Pakistan People’s Party (PPP) won 81 (all in the West Pakistani provinces of Punjab
and Sindh). The rest of the 59 seats
were won by minor parties and independent candidates without any party
affiliation. Clearly, Mujib had swept the elections, and was eager to take the
chair of the Prime Minister.
Yahya
and his coterie, as well as many West Pakistani politicians, were wary of a
government led by the Awami League, whose radical programme was interpreted as
thinly veiled separatism. There was also the anxiety about Awami League allying
with the smaller parties and independents to get a two-thirds majority, and
bulldozing its Six Point Programme in the National Assembly with full
constitutional cover. Two days after the elections, Mujib unequivocally
declared, “The election, for the people of Bangla Desh, was above all a
referendum on the vital issue of full regional autonomy on the basis of Six
Points……. therefore a Constitution securing full regional autonomy on the basis
of Six Points formula has to be framed and implemented in all respects.”[5]
It
was feared that the Awami League could even take the extreme step of an
outright declaration of independence in the National Assembly, if it felt that
the military was creating hurdles in its agenda. Misgivings also resurfaced
regarding Mujib’s past involvement (1968) in the Agartala Conspiracy case in
which he, along with 34 military officers, was accused of colluding with Indian
agents in a scheme to divide Pakistan. A trial for sedition could, however, not
go through due to large-scale protests and strikes in East Pakistan, and the charges
were eventually dropped as a political expedient.
As
if to fortify its position in the face of reservations in West Pakistan, the
Awami League held a rally in Dacca on 3
January, where all its recently elected members of the National and Provincial
Assemblies took an oath of allegiance to the Six Points. The move clearly
signalled that there was no possibility of bargaining, and the Six Points were
there to stay, unaltered.
Faced
with an utterly convoluted predicament, Yahya decided to visit Dacca on 12
January for parleys with Mujib and his team, “to come to a thorough
understanding of the Six Points.” Vice Admiral S M Ahsan, the Governor of East
Pakistan, who was in attendance, ruefully reminisced later that it was too late
to attempt a ‘thorough understanding’ of the Awami League programme. The
discussions, unsurprisingly, were frustrating for Yahya, as Mujib repeatedly
insisted on each point by proclaiming that, “There is nothing objectionable in
it. What’s wrong with it? It is so simple.”[6]
Professor G W Chaudhry, the Minister of
Communications who accompanied Yahya to Dacca, thought that Yahya was bitter
and frustrated by Mujib’s betrayal. “Mujib has let me down. Those who warned me
against him were right. I was wrong in trusting this person,” said Yahya,
according to Chaudhry.
A
completely flustered Yahya sought counsel from Bhutto at the latter’s family residence
in Larkana, to which he flew on 17 January. What transpired at Al Murtaza is not
exactly known, but it appears that Bhutto was able to convince Yahya about the
consequences of handing over power to Mujib, in view of the latter’s
unrepresentative electoral standing in West Pakistan. Bhutto and Yahya also deliberated upon the
seditious nature of Awami League’s manifesto, whose actualisation was now
imminent. “We discussed with the President the implications of the Six Points
and expressed our serious misgivings about them.”[7]
Whatever went on at Larkana during three
days of parleys (interspersed with duck shoots), Yahya emerged satisfied after
having enlisted his host’s support.
Backed
by Yahya’s brief and confident of his own astuteness, Bhutto decided to visit
Dacca on 27 January. Though piqued by the goings-on between Yahya and Bhutto in
Larkana, Awami League was still amenable to the latter’s visit. It was interested in Bhutto’s cooperation only
to the extent of rendering the President’s veto on the Constitution Bill
ineffective. There was to be no compromise on the Six Points by Awami League. Bhutto, on the other hand, was seeking a
power-sharing formula on the grounds that his Pakistan People’s Party had not
received any mandate on the Six Point Programme, and public opinion was against
it in West Pakistan. This stance was obviously unacceptable to Mujib, who was
not seeking any coalition partners. With the situation at a total impasse,
Bhutto returned from Dacca in a recalcitrant mood.
Under
the rapidly deteriorating political situation, Yahya thought it wise not to
delay the announcement of the National Assembly session any further. After all,
the veto power vested in the President by the LFO was an adequate safeguard
against the possibility of Awami League bulldozing the Six Points through the
National Assembly. Yahya had another
long discussion with Bhutto on 11 February, but without arriving
at any agreement. He decided to go ahead
with the logical next step following elections, and on 13 February, it was
announced that the National Assembly would meet at Dacca on 3 March. Two days
later, Bhutto declared at a press conference in Peshawar about his party’s
inability to attend the inaugural session of the National Assembly, “in the
absence of an understanding, compromise or adjustment of the Six Points.” He
even threatened “a revolution from Khyber to Karachi if the People’s Party were
left out.”[8]
With
people in East Pakistan already seething with resentment at the delay in power
transfer, and Bhutto outrightly threatening an uprising in West Pakistan if he
did not have his way, matters had come to a head for Yahya. He once again wore his military hat, dismissed
the civilian cabinet, and reverted to Martial Law in its classic form.
Vice
Admiral S M Ahsan and Lt Gen Sahibzada Yaqub, the Martial Law Administrator in
East Pakistan, were summoned by General Yahya to Rawalpindi for a conference on
22 February. Both were told that Mujib would be given one more opportunity to
prove his good intentions. This implied a political dialogue with Mujib,
failing which, military plans would be operationalised to regain full control
in the disorder that was bound to ensue.
While
Lt Gen Yaqub finalised the military plans for internal security, Vice Admiral
Ahsan held a round of talks with Mujib. The only outcome of the talks was that
Mujib agreed not to insist on application of the Six Points to West Pakistan,
but there would be no change to their application to East Pakistan. Nonetheless, it seemed that the Awami League
got the drift of military preparations, and was starting to show some
flexibility. Lt Gen Yaqub had, in the
meantime, sent a telegram to Yahya, urging him to visit Dacca immediately in
the hope of averting a major crisis that he saw looming.
Disregarding
Lt Gen Yaqub’s telegram, Yahya announced on 28 February a sine die
postponement of the National Assembly session, which was originally planned for
3 March. This was done ‘to allow more
time to the political parties to work out an agreement on the draft Constitution
outside the Assembly.’ To the Awami
League, this act was tantamount to repudiating the popular mandate. Yahya had overlooked
the fact that Mujib had immense street power in East Pakistan; more ominously, he
had full support of India, which would not let go the distinct possibility of Pakistan’s
break-up. Regrettably, Yahya had played into India’s hands with his ill-considered
announcement, and the die had been cast.
Postponement
of the National Assembly session resulted in immediate protests, and the start
of a civil disobedience movement in East Pakistan. Radio Pakistan Dacca was taken over by Awami
League miscreants and calls for protests were broadcast, triggering a complete
shutdown in major cities. Mujib sternly demanded an immediate transfer of power
to the elected representatives of the people of Pakistan. Sensing violence, and belatedly heeding to
some sane advice, a wavering Yahya made another announcement on 6 March for the
inaugural session of the National Assembly to start on 25 March.
Bhutto,
who had no chance of forming even a coalition government at the Centre, fast-tracked
his machinations in the wake of Yahya’s latest announcement. He cleverly
floated the idea that, “If power is to be
transferred to the people before a constitutional settlement, then it is only
fair that in East Pakistan it should go to the Awami League, and in the West to
the Pakistan People’s Party, because while the former is the majority party in
that wing, we have been returned by the people of this side.” The daily Azad
of 15 March 1971 gave a
twist to Bhutto’s speech with a startling headline that screamed, ‘udhar tum, idhar hum’
(you there, we here). Though the wording
of the headline has been incorrectly attributed to Bhutto ever since, a
confederal structure, had, in effect, been proposed by him. Bhutto’s ambition and
impatience came through clearly from his statement. His formula overlooked the fact that the Legal
Framework Order had no stipulation for a political party having to win seats in
other provinces, or both the wings, to be able to form a government at the
Centre. Mujib’s disparaging of any such belated ploys was, thus, neither
surprising, nor unfounded.
There
were a few last-minute amendments to the Six Points suggested by the Awami
League Executive Committee, which were conveyed to Lt Gen Yaqub. The amendments
called for a token ratification of some of the contentious provincial subjects
by the Central Government before implementation. These amendments were expected
to be discussed with General Yahya, if he decided to visit Dacca, which
unfortunately, he delayed until it was too late.
Civil Disobedience and
Violence
The earlier decision
to postpone the National Assembly session scheduled for 3 March had been met with extreme
derision and widespread anger in East Pakistan. Hartals (general strikes) all over the
province were ordered by the Awami League, and Mujib made it clear that the
postponement decision would not go unchallenged. Behind the scenes, though, he
again pleaded with the Governor, Vice Admiral Ahsan, for a fresh date for the
assembly session. Mujib’s request was
passed on to the Army Chief of Staff (COS), General Hamid, but instead, the top
brass took a thoughtless decision to sack the Governor, and Lt Gen Yaqub was asked
to take over that office also, on 1 March.
Press
censorship was imposed, followed by a curfew in Dacca. Mujib reacted by closing
all doors on further negotiations, and launched what he termed a ‘non-violent
non-cooperation’ movement. The Bengali staff of PIA was the first to respond by
refusing to handle flights, which brought troop reinforcements from Karachi to
Dacca. Charged crowds attacked the Government House in which six people were
killed in clashes with troops on guard duties. On 2 March, Mujib issued a statement calling
on “all sections of the society, including government servants to rise against
the unlawful government and recognise peoples’ representatives as the only
legitimate authority.” Lt Gen Yaqub talked to Mujib on telephone asking him to
withdraw the statement, but a hostile Mujib outrightly refused to oblige. The
law and order situation continued to worsen. Reports of casualties poured in
from all parts of the East Pakistan, with non-Bengalis suffering the worst at
the hands of rampaging mobs.
President
Yahya initially maintained a nonchalant attitude in the face of constant
pleading by Lt Gen Yaqub for some decision, as the situation deteriorated
rapidly. Yahya finally decided to call a meeting of all politicians in Dacca on
10 March, but Mujib reacted furiously by refusing any more ‘round-table
conferences.’ Yahya spoke to Mujib on telephone, and tried to talk him out of
his obduracy. The result of the conversation became clear only when Yahya
called Lt Gen Yaqub on the night of 4 March, and informed him that the planned visit
to Dacca had been called off. An
exasperated Lt Gen Yaqub immediately called the President’s Principal Staff
Officer (PSO), Lt Gen Peerzada, in Rawalpindi, and told him that he would be
sending in his resignation the following day. Before the resignation reached the president,
Lt Gen Tikka Khan, the Martial Law Administrator of Punjab and Commander IV
Corps, had been already been assigned to replace Lt Gen Yaqub as a three-hatted
Commander of Eastern Command, Martial Law Administrator, and Governor East
Pakistan.
The
‘non-violent’ movement that Mujib had promised was getting more and more
violent. A particularly bloody day-long battle on 3 March between the Awami
League terrorists and unarmed non-Bengalis in Pahartali, near Chittagong,
resulted in 102 deaths. In Dacca, no one
felt secure. Most of the well-off
non-Bengalis had sold off their household effects for a pittance, and purchased
tickets to fly off to Karachi. The poorer ones went into hiding or sought
refuge in the cantonment areas that were relatively safe.
On
6 March, the Awami League went into session to take a final decision on the
unilateral declaration of independence of Bangladesh. Getting wind of what might follow, President
Yahya called Mujib, advising him not to take a hasty decision, and assured him
of honouring his (Mujib’s) aspirations and commitments to the people. Yahya
also promised to visit Dacca soon. The declaration of independence was perhaps
averted as a result of the timely call, much to the satisfaction of the Martial
Law Headquarters in Dacca. The same day Yahya announced that the National
Assembly would meet on 25 March. Mujib responded to the announcement with four
preconditions for attending the session: 1) Lifting of Martial Law 2) Return of
Army to the barracks 3) Transfer of power to the people’s representatives 4) A
judicial inquiry into the killing of Bengali people.
General
Yahya decided to make one last attempt at finding a political solution to the deadlock,
and flew to Dacca on 15 March. Soon after arrival, he asked his military
commanders for a situation report. At the end of the briefing, Yahya muttered,
“Don’t worry. I will line up Mujib tomorrow … will give him a bit of my mind. Then
if he doesn’t behave, I’ll know the answer.” While the Generals in attendance
were dumbstruck, the PAF’s Air Officer Commanding (AOC), Air Cdre ‘Mitty’ Masud
sought permission to say something. After Yahya nodded a go-ahead, Mitty opened up, “Sir, the
situation is very delicate. It is essentially a political issue and needs to be
resolved politically, otherwise thousands of innocent men, women and children
will perish.” Nodding his head in fatherly fashion, Yahya replied, “Mitty, I
know it … I know it.” A few days later, the highly decorated 1965 War hero, Air
Cdre M Z Masud was relieved of his duties.
No Way Out
After a rather cold informal meeting
the following day, it was evident that the time for accommodation of any sort
between Yahya and Mujib had passed. Yahya was smug with his hold on absolute
power, while Mujib too seemed to exude complete control due to the massive
mandate of the people of East Pakistan.
During
the formal talks on 17 and 18 March, neither side was willing to compromise,
which came as no surprise. The talks failed miserably, with Yahya and Mujib
emerging dejected and irate over the fiasco. The Awami League had insisted that
Martial Law be lifted and power transferred immediately to Awami League, while
two independent committees of the National Assembly chalked out ways to
promulgate a new Constitution agreeable to both the wings. Yahya agreed to the
Awami League proposal on condition that Bhutto had no objection to it. This, despite the grave threat to Yahya’s
regime as it would lose legal sanction with the removal of martial law. As for Bhutto,
he was averse to any arrangement that saw him out of power, but, so as not to
be seen as a spoiler, he agreed to visit Dacca nonetheless.
On
arrival in Dacca on 21 March, Bhutto was briefed by Yahya about Awami League’s proposal
for power transfer. Bhutto reacted by drawing Yahya’s attention to the
impropriety of approving the scheme without full knowledge of the people. He
was of the opinion that “two or more political leaders could not ignore the
existence of the entire Assembly vested with constitutional and legislative
power.” He also told Yahya that he saw ‘seeds of two Pakistans’ in the Awami
League’s proposal.
Behind
the scenes, an apprehensive Yahya had conveyed to Lt Gen Tikka to ‘be ready’,
implying plans and preparations for military action in case the political talks
failed.
23
March, regularly celebrated countrywide as the Pakistan Resolution Day, saw tumultuous
rioting all over East Pakistan. Pakistani flags were burnt and replaced with
those of Bangla Desh, while Quaid-e-Azam’s portraits in offices were replaced
with those of Mujib-ur-Rahman. Joi Bangla (Long live Bangla Desh)
slogans could be heard everywhere. It was quite clear that the writ of Martial
Law was weak, and a parallel government, supported by the people, was in
control in East Pakistan.
The following day,
Awami League, proposed the formation of two Constitution Conventions to draw up
separate Constitutions for East and West Pakistan. The National Assembly was to
subsequently assimilate these Constitutions into a framework for the ‘Confederation
of Pakistan.’ Yahya and Bhutto met soon after the announcement, and concluded
that the Awami League had shifted radically from its demand of maximum
provincial autonomy, to the outright disintegration of Pakistan. The hint of a tenuous
link between the two wings in the Awami League offer was seen by Bhutto as a
hindrance to his quest for absolute power – a departure from his earlier position
of sharing power under the so-called udhar tum, idhar hum formula, which
was no less a confederal arrangement. Yahya, on the other hand saw it as the
first step towards secession under his watch, and may have apprehended a severe
reaction within the Army, as well as the masses in West Pakistan. Matters had
come to such a pass, that use of force to keep the country united seemed to be the
only remaining option for Yahya.
[Read Part III here.]
[1] The four provinces, the federally administered tribal
areas, and 10 of the 13 princely states of the western wing were merged into a
single province of West Pakistan on 30 September 1955, although an official
announcement had been made a year earlier. This arrangement, called the One
Unit, lasted till it was rescinded by President Yahya Khan on 1 July 1970.
[2] The Legal Framework Order was announced by President
Yahya on 31 March 1970. It laid down the principles of the future constitution
to guarantee the ‘inviolability of national integrity’ and the ‘Islamic
character of the Republic’.
[3] The name Bangla Desh was originally written as two words, a convention
that was discontinued after independence. The two-worded nomenclature is
referred to as such because of mention in various books, before the name
Bangladesh was adopted.
[4] This statement is said to have been secretly recorded
on tape by intelligence agents, and was played to President Yahya, as claimed
in Last Days of United Pakistan, G W
Chaudhry; Hurst and Company, London, page 98. The statement has also been
quoted in Witness to Surrender by
Siddiq Salik.
[5] The Pakistan
Observer, Dacca, 10 December 1970.
[6] Quote attributed to Vice Admiral Ahsan, Governor of East
Pakistan, by Siddiq Salik in Witness to
Surrender, page 33.
[7] The Great Tragedy, Zulfiqar Ali
Bhutto, 1971, page 20.
[8] The Dawn,
Karachi, 16 February 1971.
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